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1. Introduction 
 Clients of state vocational rehabilitation (VR) agencies who also receive income 
support from either of two disability programs administered by the Social Security 
Administration (SSA) – Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) and Supplemental 
Security Income (SSI) – attain lower employment and earnings outcomes than other VR 
clients. The differences were most recently documented in the findings from the 
Longitudinal Study of Vocational Rehabilitation Services Programs (LSVRSP). For 
instance, Hayward and Schmidt (2003a) find that of those achieving an employment 
outcome, 43.9 percent were receiving SSDI or SSI benefits at study entry, versus 55.1 
percent for those not achieving an employment outcome. The reasons for these outcome 
differences are not known. In this paper we consider two possible explanations: 
differences in personal characteristics, and differences in economic incentives. 
Beneficiary clients (i.e., those clients who are receiving SSDI or SSI benefits at 
the time of application for VR services) presumably have personal characteristics that are 
different, on average, than those of non-beneficiary clients, and these differences might 
reduce their relative prospects for employment and earnings. It seems likely that the 
physical and mental conditions underlying their disabilities are different in their nature, 
and are, on average, more severe. All beneficiary clients have been determined by SSA to 
be unable to work at any substantial gainful activity (SGA) by reason of a medically 
determinable impairment that will last for at least 12 months or end in death.1 Differences 
are not necessarily as large as the previous observation might suggest, however. 
Beneficiaries who use VR services might typically have less severe medical conditions 
than other SSA beneficiaries, and some may have experienced at least partial medical 
improvement since SSA’s determination. Further, some non-beneficiary clients might 
meet the SSA standard, and some might be in the benefit application process. Thus, 
                                                 
1 We use the term “beneficiary client” to refer to VR clients that are either SSDI or SSI 
beneficiaries, or both. Although the two programs are different in significant ways that 
could impact work outcomes for beneficiary clients, and the beneficiaries have markedly 
different characteristics that affect work outcomes, the conceptual issues we investigate 
apply to both programs. Further, as discussed later, we are skeptical about the validity of 
the information in the LSVRSP data concerning which program the client receives 
benefits from.  
1 
although it seems likely that the physical and medical conditions of beneficiary clients 
are more challenging, on average, than those of all SSDI and SSI beneficiaries when it 
comes to work, we do not know how large the differences are.  
Other personal characteristics might also disadvantage the work efforts of 
beneficiary clients relative to non-beneficiary clients, on average. This might be 
especially true for SSI recipients, many of whom have had their condition since birth or 
childhood, have limited education, and/or have little or no work experience before 
receiving VR services. Other personal issues that might make work more problematic for 
beneficiary clients than others include: difficult marital and living situations; relatively 
low income, less in-kind and/or moral support from family and friends; membership in 
disadvantaged racial or ethnic groups; family responsibilities that compete with work;  
inadequate housing; and transportation problems.  
It also seems likely that beneficiary clients typically have less economic incentive 
to obtain substantial earnings than non-beneficiary clients, holding personal 
characteristics constant, because doing so would result in loss of some or all of their 
benefit income. Their public health insurance benefits, which are linked to their income 
benefits, might also be jeopardized. SSDI beneficiaries who work can retain their income 
benefits indefinitely, as long as their monthly earnings are below the SGA level and they 
continue to meet SSA’s medical eligibility criteria, but they lose their benefits entirely 
once their earnings are above SGA level ($500 per month during the study period) after a 
Trial Work Period (TWP).2 The TWP allows a beneficiary to have substantial earnings 
for nine out of 60 consecutive months before earnings above the SGA level would lead to 
benefit loss. Certain Impairment Related Work Expenses (IRWEs) are deducted from 
earnings before the SGA test is applied.3 SSDI beneficiaries receiving benefits for 24 
months or longer are also entitled to Medicare. During the period of relevance to our 
data, Medicare benefits terminated 36 months after SSDI termination.4  
                                                 
2 The SGA for blind beneficiaries is substantially higher. Because the number of blind 
beneficiaries in the sample is very small, we ignore this distinction in the analysis. 
3 During the period under consideration, a month was counted as a TWP month only if 
earnings were above $350 after deductions for IRWEs. 
4 The 1999 Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act extended this period to 
8.5 years. 
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SSI recipient earnings are subject to the provisions of Section 1619 of the Social 
Security Act; monthly payments are reduced by one dollar for every two dollars earned 
after a small earnings disregard and deductions for IRWEs and any earnings set aside 
under a Plan to Achieve Self Support (PASS). In most states all SSI recipients are 
categorically eligible for Medicaid, and in others most are. Medicaid rules vary by state, 
but until recently eligibility was jeopardized for almost all SSI recipients if SSI payments 
ended and the recipient’s income increased beyond a limit set by Section 1619.5 For 
beneficiaries in both SSA programs, the risk of health insurance loss is particularly 
important for those who might not be able to obtain jobs from employers that provide 
employee health insurance benefits, as well as for those who have health care service 
needs that might be poorly covered by private insurers.  
VR agencies may serve to reinforce these disincentives. Although not well 
documented, there is much anecdotal evidence that VR counselors and others who act as 
formal or informal advisors to beneficiary clients reinforce the effects of the disincentives 
that are inherent to the SSDI and SSI programs, because they often believe it is in the 
client’s best interest to maintain benefit eligibility. The long history of less successful 
outcomes for beneficiary clients, along with counselor knowledge of work disincentives 
for beneficiaries, might also translate into reduced expectations for beneficiary success. 
Hence, even after due consideration of a client’s individual characteristics, a VR agency 
might invest fewer of its scarce resources in a beneficiary client than a non-beneficiary 
client.  
Countering this point, however, is the fact that SSA will pay VR agencies for 
services provided to SSA beneficiary clients if certain earnings conditions are met, 
whereas providing services to other clients does not typically have the potential for 
generating additional funding.6 During the period relevant to our study, SSA reimbursed 
VR agencies for costs up to a limit related to potential benefit savings provided that the 
beneficiary achieved earnings above the SGA level for at least nine months. Thus, VR 
                                                 
5 Recent implementation of Medicaid buy-in programs in a significant number of states 
has mitigated the risk of losing Medicaid because of work, but substantial risk remains in 
most states (Goodman and Livermore, 2004). 
6 The recent introduction of the Ticket to Work program increased the incentives that VR 
agencies have to help beneficiaries attain earnings sufficient to end their income benefits. 
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agencies have greater financial incentives to help beneficiary clients achieve successful 
employment outcomes than they do for other clients, holding other characteristics 
constant.7  
In this paper we use the LSVRSP data to document the differences between VR 
outcomes for beneficiary and non-beneficiary clients in more detail. We consider 
outcomes at every stage over the period captured by this longitudinal study: eligibility 
determination, service delivery, closure and the approximately 12-month period after 
closure. We also assess the extent to which observed differences can be explained by 
differences in the characteristics of beneficiary and non-beneficiary clients at the time of 
their application for VR services. The LSVRSP contains information on such 
characteristics that is much richer than in any other available data set. If incentives play a 
significant role in explaining outcome differences, then substantial differences should 
remain after controlling for differences in characteristics. The data do not support a 
formal test of whether incentives matter, because characteristics not captured in the data 
might explain residual differences in outcomes. They do, however, allow us to determine 
how much of a role potentially remains for incentives after controlling for client 
characteristics at application.  
In Section 2 we describe the LSVRSP data, define the variables we use in this 
study, and discuss the statistical methods employed. We then consider each of the 
following questions: 
1. How do the medical and non-medical characteristics of applicants for VR services 
during this period differ by beneficiary status? (Section 3) 
2. To what extent does the probability of being determined eligible depend on 
beneficiary status, before and after controlling for characteristics at application? 
Similarly, to what extent does the probability of service receipt depend on beneficiary 
status, before and after controlling for differences in characteristics at application? 
(Section 4) 
                                                 
7 Note that SSA’s rules for paying a VR for services provided to an beneficiary do not 
require earnings sufficient to terminate SSA benefits. In fact, because of the work 
incentive provisions of the SSI and SSDI programs, a beneficiary can, with some care, 
earn enough to meet SSA’s rules for paying the VR, but remain eligible for benefits. 
Potentially, a VR counselor could help ensure that a beneficiary client earns enough to 
meet SSA’s payment criteria, but not enough to lose the client’s eligibility for SSA 
benefits.  
4 
3. For those who actually receive services, how does the likelihood of rehabilitation at 
closure vary with beneficiary status, before and after controlling for other 
characteristics at application? (Section 5) 
4. For those closed as “rehabilitated,” how is beneficiary status related to employment in 
competitive and paid jobs at closure, before and after controlling for other 
characteristics at application. We focus on employment in competitive jobs and 
employment in paid jobs. For those in paid jobs, we further consider the relationship 
between beneficiary status on closure job characteristics (hourly wages, hours 
worked, monthly earnings, health insurance, earnings above SGA, and profession, 
managerial or technical occupation), before and after controlling for other 
characteristics at application. (Section 6) 
5. For those who receive services, how does beneficiary status affect employment in 
competitive and paid jobs at “follow-up” (approximately 12 months after closure)? 
For those in paid jobs, we further consider the relationship between beneficiary status 
and closure job characteristics, before and after controlling for other characteristics at 
application. (Section 7) 
6. For those who receive services, how are months of paid employment of served clients 
during the entire 15 month period from three months prior to closure to 12 months 
after closure related to beneficiary status? During the same period, how is the 
probability of earnings above SGA for at least nine months related to beneficiary 
status, both before and after controlling for other characteristics at application? 
(Section 8) 
We summarize the findings and draw conclusions in Section 9. 
2. Data and Methods 
A. The LSVRSP Data 
The LSVRSP followed a sample of applicants to and consumers of VR services, 
through a series of interviews and administrative data abstraction efforts. Data collection 
began in 1995 and ended in 2000. Sample acquisition was spread over the first two years, 
and each of the 8,500 participants was tracked for three years. The study followed a 
multistage design that involved selection of a random sample of 40 local VR offices, 
located in 30 states, and, among those offices, a sample of 8,500 applicants and current 
and former consumers of VR services. The study included three cohorts, defined by their 
stage in the VR service process at the time of the first interview. The “applicant” cohort 
makes up 25 percent of the sample; respondents were first interviewed while they applied 
for VR services. The “recipient” cohort makes up 50 percent of the sample and 
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respondents were first interviewed while they were receiving VR services. The “exited” 
cohort makes up 25 percent of the sample and respondents were first interviewed shortly 
after closure.  
Each sample member was administered a baseline interview and up to three 
annual follow-up interviews. The questionnaires varied across the three cohorts, 
reflecting their differing stages in the VR process. Topics covered include work history, 
functioning, vocational interests and attitudes, independence and community integration, 
and consumer perspectives on VR participation. Records abstraction included consumer 
characteristics and detailed information on services; records were abstracted when the 
consumer entered the study and quarterly until the person exited VR.8  
In the remainder of this paper we use “follow-up” to refer to data collected at 
approximately 12 months after closure. The follow-up survey that these data correspond 
to varies across the three sample cohorts. 
B. Characteristics at application 
Characteristics of the client at the time of application for VR services play an 
important role in the analyses. We focus on characteristics at application because we are 
interested in how the characteristics of the client affect VR outcomes. Some 
characteristics change as VR services are delivered, and others may change at later 
periods. For some this change is clearly exogenous to outcomes of interest (e.g., age), but 
for many others it is possible that changes are an outcome of the use of VR services. 
Because data collection for the three cohorts of the LSVRSP starts at different 
points in the process, data on some characteristics at application are not collected in an 
identical fashion for members of all three cohorts. Fortunately, many of the most 
important characteristics were abstracted from VR agency records. Variables included in 
the analysis include conventional measures for demographic variables (sex, age, race, 
marital status, and dependents), as well as extensive data on the individual’s income 
benefits, disability, education, and work experience. Characteristics at application that 
                                                 
8 See RTI International (2003) for further details. The cited document, the data, 
codebooks, instruments, and additional technical information can be found at 
www.lsvrsp.org. 
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were not collected for all three cohorts are generally not used in the analysis. Perhaps 
most significantly, we did not include psychosocial measures for concepts such as self-
esteem and motivation that are available at application for the applicant cohort, but the 
other two.  
The key income benefit variable is for the SSI and SSDI programs. Although the 
data set includes separate indicators for SSI and SSDI, and also distinguishes between the 
three categories of SSI (blind, disabled and aged), and there are important distinctions 
between these two programs, in most of the analysis we have used a single indicator (i.e., 
dummy) variable to indicate receipt of either SSI or SSDI benefits at application. The 
reason for this simplification is that the two programs are often confused by beneficiaries 
and others, in part because the programs have many common features, including 
administration by the same agency, use of the same medical eligibility criteria, and use of 
the same eligibility determination process. Further, some beneficiaries move from one 
program to the other as non-medical factors affecting eligibility (e.g., satisfaction of the 
SSDI five-month waiting period, and satisfaction of the SSDI work history requirements) 
change. Statistics for the reported SSI and SSDI categories appear in Section 3.9  
We also include indicator variables for income support from each of these 
additional sources: Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC – replaced during 
the study period by Temporary Assistance to Needy Families), veterans’ benefits, 
workers compensation, private disability insurance, and family or friends. Some 
respondents also lived in special facilities for people with disabilities. We include 
indicators for institution, substance abuse treatment center, supported living, and other.  
The disability variables include an indicator for acquired (versus congenital) 
onset, the indicator for severity that is used by the VR agencies (not severe, severe, most 
severe) and a categorical variable for disability type. Concerning the latter, the LSVRSP 
collected extensive information about disability type through its data abstraction efforts. 
These data are very rich, but complex. In addition, because of differences in recording 
practices across states, and even across counselors within states, we found that much 
work needed to be done to develop categorical variables that would be useful for our 
                                                 
9 The LSVRSP collected data on benefit income at application. That information would 
have been useful to this study, but is not included in the public use data file. 
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analysis. This was especially true for the many records with psychiatric and orthopedic 
conditions. Descriptive statistics for the full set of disability-related variables appear in 
Section 3. For our multivariate analyses, we simplified these variables into a single 15-
category variable, aggregating across groups with relatively few respondents. The 
categories are: hearing, learning disability, mental retardation, non-orthopedic physical, 
orthopedic – 3 or more limbs, orthopedic – other accident, orthopedic – other, neurosis, 
psychotic depression/bi-polar disorder, schizophrenia/paranoia/other psychosis, other 
mental illness, substance abuse, traumatic brain injury, and vision.  
The LSVRSP has conventional measures of education as well as information on 
receipt of special education. In Section 3 we report educational information for the 
highest level of education achieved (“educational attainment”), cross classified by receipt 
of special education. In about 16 percent of cases special education status is not known. 
For the multivariate analysis we constructed a 7-category variable that reflects the joint 
distribution of educational attainment and receipt of special education, derived by 
aggregating categories with few respondents into adjacent categories.  
The LSVRSP also has extensive information on the work experience and training 
of VR clients prior to VR application. In most analysis we include variables for: prior VR 
receipt, work status at application (working, homemaker/unpaid family worker, student, 
trainee/volunteer, looking for work, not looking for work), work for at least two weeks in 
the 24 months prior to application, work prior to disability onset, and work after disability 
onset. 
C.  Closure status  
The VR agency assigns a status code to each client’s case. The status code is 
updated as the client continues through the rehabilitation process, and a final status code 
is assigned at closure. The closure status codes found in the LSVRSP data are indicated 
in Exhibit 2.1. For our purposes, we refer to those with closure status code 8 as 
“ineligible,” and all others as “eligible.” Among those eligible, we refer to those with 
closure status 30 as “not served,” and all others as “served.” Among those served, we 
refer to those closed in status 26 as “rehabilitated” and those in status 28 as “not 
rehabilitated.” Closure status 38 is for clients who receive post-employment services 
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before closure. As there were only five such closures in the sample and some had 
incomplete data, we did not include them in the analysis.  
D. Samples and Weighting 
The complex design of the LSVRSP implies that data from the appropriate 
cohorts must be used in conducting specific analyses, and appropriate weights must also 
be used. Most importantly, the analysis of eligibility uses data from the applicant cohort 
only, because the samples for the recipient and exited cohorts by definition include only 
persons who were determined to be eligible. For the analysis of outcomes among those 
determined eligible, we include records from all three cohorts, but exclude those who did 
not receive services. 
For descriptive statistics, we adopted the convention of reporting missing values 
along with other categories. For multivariate analyses, however, we dropped observations 
with incomplete data for one or more of the relevant variables. This causes some 
differences between the descriptive statistics reported and the corresponding statistics 
from the samples for the multivariate analysis. In general, these discrepancies are small 
and inconsequential for the findings. There are, however, two important exceptions. First, 
the LSVRSP does not include extensive data on employment outcomes at closure for 
clients who were served but closed as not rehabilitated (status 28), apparently because 
administrative records provided little information on these outcomes. These clients were 
included in a post-closure follow-up survey, and many were employed at the time of that 
survey, which suggests that many might also have been employed at closure. That is, the 
number of served clients who are employed at closure might be substantially higher than 
the number who were both rehabilitated and employed. Because of this limitation in the 
data, we confine attention to those who were closed as rehabilitated (status 26) whenever 
we make comparisons of employment at closure and follow-up, and report separate 
employment statistics at follow-up for all served clients. 
Second, attrition from the study means that the sample available for analysis of 
follow-up employment is smaller than the sample available for analysis of employment at 
closure. Comparison of employment statistics at closure for the sample of rehabilitated 
clients with complete follow-up data to corresponding statistics for all those with 
9 
complete data at closure revealed that those with follow-up data had better employment 
outcomes at closure than those without follow-up data. Hence, we adjust outcome 
estimates at follow-up for attrition bias, based on comparison of statistics for these two 
samples at closure. The adjustment is described in Section 7. 
E. Hierarchical Modeling 
As indicated earlier, we consider differences in outcomes at each major stage of 
the VR process from eligibility determination through approximately 12 months after 
closure. The initial analysis of these differences is hierarchical. That is, we first analyze 
eligibility, then analyze service receipt conditional on eligibility receipt, then analyze 
rehabilitation at closure and follow-up employment conditional on service receipt. There 
is also hierarchical modeling within the closure and follow-up stages. At closure, we 
model paid and competitive employment conditional on rehabilitation, and then model 
characteristics of paid jobs conditional on paid employment. Analogous models are 
estimated at follow-up. We also analyze two employment outcomes over a 15 month 
period that begins three months before closure, conditional on service receipt.  
For each analysis, we examine differences between beneficiary and non-
beneficiary outcomes, conditional on each having reached that stage. For instance, we 
consider the difference in the percentage with paid jobs at closure, conditional on having 
been closed as rehabilitated. Because we are using hierarchical modeling, our analysis 
isolates the relationship between beneficiary status and obtaining paid employment once 
rehabilitated. The results show that differences in the first two stages – through being 
served – are small, although significant. After that, though, there are more substantial 
differences at every stage, before and after controlling for other characteristics at 
application. Differences in outcomes for the conditional analyses at latter stages therefore 
understate, substantially, differences in outcome for all beneficiary and non-beneficiary 
clients because they ignore the cumulative effects of differences at earlier stages. Most of 
the discussion in the body of the paper focuses on the conditional models at the various 
stages in the hierarchy. In the concluding section, we translate these findings into 
cumulative differences for all beneficiary and non-beneficiary clients, before and after 
adjustment for beneficiary characteristics.  
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F. Adjustment for differences in characteristics at Application 
Much of the paper is concerned with comparing differences in outcomes for 
beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries before and after adjusting for differences in their 
characteristics at application. We use multivariate analysis methods for this purpose. Two 
types of multivariate models are used: regression and logit (i.e., logistic regression). 
Regression is used to analyze the differences in means for continuous outcomes, and logit 
is used to analyze differences in percentages for categorical (binomial) outcomes. Each of 
these models include beneficiary status at application as the key explanatory, or 
“independent” variable, plus a long list of other characteristics  
Estimated regression models can be used in a straightforward manner to 
decompose the difference between the means of the outcome (“dependent”) variable for 
beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries into differences accounted for by the independent 
variables other than beneficiary status and residual differences accounted for by 
beneficiary status (also an independent variable). The method takes advantage of these 
two features of regression: a) each independent variable’s coefficient can be interpreted 
as the change in the mean of the dependent variable per unit change in the independent 
variable, holding the other independent variables constant, and b) the coefficient 
multiplied by the difference in the variable’s means for the two samples can be 
interpreted as the difference in the dependent variable’s mean that is accounted for by 
that independent variable, holding the other independent variables constant. Further, 
when the contributions of each independent variable, computed in this fashion, are added 
together, the sum is exactly equal to the difference in means for the dependent variable. 
The decomposition method for logit models is slightly more complex because, 
unlike multiple regression models, the logit model involves a non-linear relationship 
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between the dependent (categorical) variable and the independent variables.10 The 
findings, however can be interpreted in the same way; i.e. we decompose the difference 
in percentages into the difference accounted for by characteristics other than beneficiary 
status, holding beneficiary status constant, and the difference due to beneficiary status, 
holding the other independent variables constant.  
3. Applicant Characteristics 
We estimate that just over one quarter (26.3 percent) of the applicants for VR 
services were beneficiaries at the time they applied. As discussed below, comparison of 
the medical and non-medical characteristics of the two applicant groups makes it clear 
that beneficiary applicants face significantly greater challenges to working, on average, 
than non-beneficiary applicants.  
A. Disability Variables 
The data on disability show that, on the whole, beneficiary applicants have 
substantially more challenging physical or mental conditions than non-beneficiary 
applicants (Exhibit 3.1). The broad measure of disability severity shows that an estimated  
                                                 
10 For the logit model, each observation’s dependent variable takes on one of two values 
(zero or one), to represent the two possible categories. The mean of these values from a 
sample is the percentage of observations with in the category that is assigned a one. The 
logit model specifies that the logarithm of the “odds ratio” of the categorical outcome 
variable (the “logit”) has a linear relationship with the independent variables, where the 
odds ratio is the (unobserved) probability that the outcome is one divided by the 
probability that it is zero. The decomposition methodology for the logit models proceeds 
as follows. First, we use the logit estimate for each independent variable’s coefficient and 
the difference between the variable’s means for beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries to 
estimate the contribution of the variable’s difference in means to the difference in the 
mean values of the logits for beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, holding other 
independent variables constant. The logits and the means of the logits are not observed, 
but the sum of the contributions of all independent variables to the difference in means of 
the logits can be interpreted as an estimate of the difference in the means of the logits. 
Hence, we can compute the share of each independent variable’s contribution to the 
difference in the means of the logits. The last step is to compute each independent 
variable’s contribution to the difference in percentages for the dependent variable by 
multiplying the actual difference by the share of the difference in mean logits that is 
accounted for by the same variable. By construction, the differences accounted for by the 
independent variables will sum to the total difference in percentages. 
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1.6 percent of beneficiary applicants were in the most severely disabled category, 
compared to just 20.5 percent for non-beneficiary applicants. Only 6.7 percent of the 
beneficiary applicants were in the “non-severe” group, versus 24.2 percent of the non-
beneficiary applicants. The functional status variables show that the share of beneficiary 
applicants with low functional status in each of the three areas measured is substantially 
higher than the corresponding share for non-beneficiary applicants. A larger share of the 
beneficiary applicants has also had their medical condition since birth (27.5 percent 
versus 20.1 percent). 
The VR data on the primary cause of disability show that the mix of medical 
conditions for beneficiary applicants is quite different than that for non-beneficiary 
applicants, in ways that suggest both greater severity and lower likelihood of medical 
improvement. Beneficiary applicants are much less likely than others to have an 
orthopedic impairment, including amputation (19.6 percent versus 30.0 percent), but are 
much more likely to be in the “3+ limbs/entire body” subcategory (5.4 percent versus 2.6 
percent) – the subcategory that likely includes those with the most challenging orthopedic 
conditions. We do not find statistically significant differences between orthopedic 
impairments by cause except for “other accidents, injuries and poisonings.” In fact, it 
appears that the higher prevalence of orthopedic impairments among non-beneficiary 
applicants is entirely due to a higher prevalence of orthopedic impairments that are due to 
this cause. Compared to other causes, which include congenital conditions, several 
chronic diseases, intracranial hemorrhage/stroke and spinal chord injuries, such 
impairments are likely to be less permanent in nature.  
Beneficiary applicants are more likely than others to be classified in a mental 
illness or substance abuse category (34.1 percent versus 28.1 percent). The difference is 
larger if the substance abuse category is omitted (30.2 percent versus 18.8 percent). 
Significantly larger shares of beneficiary applicants than other applicants have what are 
commonly regarded as the most severe mental illnesses: schizophrenia/paranoia, 
psychoses other than psychotic depression, and manic depression.  
 Beneficiary applicants are also more likely than others to be classified as having 
mental retardation (13.1 percent versus 4.9 percent), and are somewhat more likely to 
have a traumatic brain injury (4.7 versus 2.2 percent). Although such applicants might 
13 
well obtain employment, we would expect the earnings of those who do to be relatively 
low. Beneficiary applicants are also significantly more likely than others to have vision 
impairments (7.6 percent versus 3.5 percent). Non-beneficiary applicants are much more 
likely than beneficiary applicants to have a learning disability (10.2 percent versus 3.8 
percent). 
B. Demographic Characteristics 
Other characteristics of beneficiary applicants are also quite different than those 
of non-beneficiary applicants. Some of the differences in other characteristics might be 
explained by differences in medical conditions, but other causes might also be important. 
Many, but not all, of the differences would lead us to expect less successful work 
outcomes for beneficiary clients than for others. 
Turning first to demographic variables (Exhibit 3.2), beneficiary applicants are, 
on average, somewhat older than non-beneficiary applicants. They are substantially more 
likely to be black (23.2 percent versus 14.3 percent), and substantially likely to be 
Hispanic (6.7 percent versus 10.7 percent). Beneficiary applicants are much less likely 
than others to be married, almost entirely because more have never been married (55.4 
percent versus 44.0 percent), despite the fact that they tend to be older. They are also less 
likely to have dependents (59.7 percent have no dependents versus 49.1 percent for 
others). Although large majorities of both groups live in private residences, the share in 
other living situations is substantially higher for beneficiary applicants than for others 
(9.5 percent versus 5.4 percent). The difference is due to the larger share of beneficiary 
applicants who live in supported living facilities (7.1 percent versus 2.5 percent for other 
applicants). 
C. Education, Training and Work Experience 
Beneficiary applicants reported substantially less previous education and training 
than non-beneficiary applicants. To avoid what would likely be inappropriate 
comparisons of educational attainment for those who received some special education 
and those who did not, we focus on attainment by special education status (Exhibit 3.3). 
Beneficiary applicants were more likely to report special education receipt than non-
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beneficiary applicants (21.3 percent versus 15.3 percent). They were also less likely to 
report no special education and attainment of at least a high school degree (40.3 percent 
versus 50.5 percent), although they were about equally likely to have no special 
education and a higher degree of some sort. Beneficiary applicants were also somewhat 
less likely than non-beneficiary applicants to be students at the time of application (11.5 
percent versus 13.9 percent). A relatively large share of beneficiary applicants had a prior 
VR closure (18.7 percent versus 11.5 percent for others), and 4.6 percent had had at least 
two prior VR closures, compared to 1.2 percent for others. 
 Beneficiary applicants also reported much less work experience than non-
applicants at the time of application – another reason to expect less employment success 
at closure (Exhibit 3.4). Many more non-beneficiary applicants than beneficiary 
applicants were working at the time of application (31.7 percent versus 17.0 percent). 
Slightly more had also worked for at least a year prior to disability onset (44.2 percent 
versus 42.2 percent), and after onset (58.6 percent versus 44.9 percent). Further, among 
those who had worked in the 24 months prior to VR application, non-beneficiary 
applicants typically had higher wages than beneficiary applicants.11 For example, 76.3 
percent of non-beneficiary applicants reported that they earned at least $5.00 per hour, 
compared to 62.3 percent of beneficiary applicants; the corresponding numbers reporting 
wages of at least $10 per hour are 25.1 percent and 15.9 percent.  
D. Financial Assistance 
The hypothesis that beneficiary applicants have less of an incentive to work than 
non-beneficiary applicants assumes that non-beneficiary applicants are not receiving 
comparable assistance that is also contingent on earnings. This assumption is confirmed 
from the data, but we also find that 28.1 percent of non-beneficiary applicants did report 
some type of financial assistance at the time of application, including significant numbers 
with assistance from sources that are known to be contingent on earnings (e.g., AFDC, 
workers’ compensation, and private disability insurance). It seems reasonable to 
conclude, however, that, on the whole, beneficiary applicants for VR services do have 
                                                 
11 The wage statistics are for the last job held in the 24-month period. 
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less of a financial incentive to work than non-beneficiary applicants because of the 
assistance they receive, other things equal.  
4. Eligibility and Service receipt 
Beneficiary applicants were somewhat more likely to be found eligible for 
benefits than non-beneficiary applicants. The point estimate for the share found eligible is 
4.9 percentage points higher for beneficiaries than for non-beneficiaries (Exhibit 4.1). In 
the sample with complete data on characteristics at application, however, the difference is 
much smaller (1.7 percentage points) and the percentage found eligible is larger for both 
beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. Note that, for both beneficiaries and non-
beneficiaries, the percentage determined eligible is substantially higher for those with 
complete data than for those without, indicating a strong relationship between incomplete 
data and eligibility. It appears that many applicants both fail to complete the application 
process and fail to supply some of the administrative data that is captured by the 
LSVRSP.  
After controlling for other characteristics at application using the sample with 
complete data, the difference declines further, to 1.3 percentage points. The disability 
variables alone, and especially the severity variable, account for more than the unadjusted 
difference in percentages before adjustment, but their effects on the difference are 
substantially offset by the effects of the experience variables (Exhibit 4.2, left column).  
Among those determined eligible, however, beneficiary clients are less likely than 
others to receive services (82.8 percent versus 87.0 percent). Adjustment for beneficiary 
characteristics increases the difference slightly (Exhibit 4.1) – a finding that runs counter 
to the findings for all other outcome variables we have considered. The reason is mostly 
due to differences in disability characteristics. That is, holding other things constant, the 
VR agencies were more likely to provide services to eligible clients with disability 
characteristics similar to those of beneficiary clients than those of non-beneficiary clients. 
All together, differences in disability characteristics increase the likelihood that 
beneficiaries determined eligible will receive services by 2.2 percentage points relative to 
non-beneficiaries. The multivariate analysis indicates that differences in the work 
experience variables increase the difference in percentage served by 2.0 percentage 
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points, but this increase is almost entirely offset by the effects of differences in the 
disability variables (Exhibit 4.2, second column). Differences in education also increase 
the difference in the percentage of non-beneficiaries served relative to beneficiaries. 
The findings are consistent with the hypothesis that the VR agencies are most 
likely to follow up with those who face the most difficult medical challenges, once an 
applicant is determined to be eligible. Another hypothesis is that those eligible clients 
with the least challenging medical conditions are more likely to stop seeking services 
because of other opportunities that become available to them before service delivery 
starts. The composite category schizophrenia/ paranoia/other psychoses appears to be an 
exception to both hypotheses. A plausible explanation of this exception is that the nature 
of these conditions reduces the chance that the client follows through with obtaining 
services. It might also be, however, that the VR agencies are less well prepared to provide 
services to such clients than they are to others.  
5. Rehabilitation Status at Closure 
The VR agencies closed 58.2 percent of those beneficiaries who received services 
(closure status 26 or 28) as rehabilitated (status 26). The same percentage for non-
beneficiary clients was substantially higher: 70.4 percent (Exhibit 5.1). The difference is 
somewhat larger in the sample with complete data on characteristics at application (13.7 
percent versus 12.2 percent). We found that only one quarter of this difference (3.0 
percentage points) could be accounted for by differences in other characteristics at 
application.  
Several characteristics substantially reduce the percentage rehabilitated for 
beneficiary clients relative to non-beneficiary clients, but these are partially offset by the 
effects of others (Exhibit 5.2). The most important of the former is employment 
experience, especially post-disability experience. The latter variable is a strong, positive 
predictor of rehabilitation, and the percentage of served beneficiary clients with such 
post-disability employment experience is much lower than for others (66.2 versus 77.1 
percent).12 Our estimates indicate that this factor alone would account for a difference in 
                                                 
12 Logistic regression results and means for the rehabilitation analysis are reported in 
Appendix A.3. 
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the percentage rehabilitated of 2.8 percentage points. Another work experience variable 
that accounts for a substantial share of the lower rehabilitation rate for beneficiary clients 
is previous VR closure. Clients with at least one prior closure are less likely to be 
rehabilitated at closure than those who have none, holding other things constant, and a 
much larger share of beneficiary clients than non-beneficiary clients have received 
services previously (27.1 versus 14.4 percent). We estimate that this difference increases 
the difference in the percentage rehabilitated by 0.7 percentage points. Other measures of 
previous employment and main activity at time of application have significant effects. In 
general, the more previous employment, the more likely is rehabilitation at closure, and 
beneficiary clients have less previous employment, on average, than others. Combined, 
all measures of employment and other activity at the time of application account for 4.9 
percentage points of the difference in the percentage rehabilitated at closure. 
Differences in marital status and race also help account for the difference in the 
percentage rehabilitated. Married clients are more likely than others to be rehabilitated at 
closure, holding other things constant, and beneficiary clients are less likely to be married 
than non-beneficiary clients. We estimate that the difference in percentage married 
increases the difference in the percentage rehabilitated by 1.0 percentage points. African-
Americans are less likely to be rehabilitated at closure, other things constant, and the 
share of beneficiary clients in this racial category is larger than the share of non-
beneficiary clients. The estimated effect is to increase the difference in the percentage 
rehabilitated by 0.3 percentage points. 
Differences in means for some other characteristics at application partially offset 
the effects of those discussed above; that is, they increase the percentage rehabilitated for 
beneficiary clients relative to others. Most importantly, the net effect of differences in the 
disability variables is to increase the percentage of beneficiary clients rehabilitated by an 
estimated 2.5 percentage points.  
The main source of this positive effect is condition type. Rehabilitation status at 
closure varies significantly by condition type, holding other things (including 
acquired/congenital and severity rating) constant. The following list is a ranking of the 14 
condition categories we used, from the condition with the highest likelihood of 
rehabilitation at closure to the condition with the lowest, other things constant: vision 
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impairment; hearing impairment; mental retardation; orthopedic condition impairment 
involving three or more limbs; orthopedic injury other than spinal chord; non-orthopedic 
physical; substance abuse; psychotic or bipolar depression; other orthopedic; 
schizophrenia, paranoia, or other psychosis; spinal chord injury; neurosis; other mental 
illness; learning disability; and Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI). We estimate that the 
likelihood of rehabilitation at closure for a client in the highest probability category 
(vision impairment) is 40.5 percentage points higher than for a client in the lowest 
probability category (TBI), other things constant. 
There are substantial differences in the condition type distributions for beneficiary 
and non-beneficiary clients. These differences increase the percentage rehabilitated for 
beneficiary clients relative to non-beneficiary clients. We estimate the following specific 
contributions (value in parentheses is the estimated effect): a) the relatively large number 
of beneficiary clients with vision impairments (1.1 percentage points) and mental 
retardation (1.1 percentage points), both of which rank very high in the above list; and b) 
the relatively large number of non-beneficiary clients with learning disabilities (1.3 
percentage points), which ranks near the bottom. Categories that diminish the likelihood 
of rehabilitation for beneficiary clients relative to non-beneficiary clients include: hearing 
impairment (-0.4 percentage points), which is predictive of relatively high percentage 
rehabilitated, is found less frequently for beneficiary clients than for non-beneficiary 
clients; schizophrenia, paranoia, and other psychosis (-0.4 percentage points) which is 
predictive of relatively low percentage rehabilitated and relatively more frequent for 
beneficiary clients; and TBI (-0.2 percentage points), which is predictive of relatively low 
percentage rehabilitated and is relatively frequent for beneficiary clients. Holding the 
other disability variables constant, differences in disability type increase the percentage 
rehabilitated for beneficiaries relative to non-beneficiaries by 2.7 percentage points. 
Differences in means for the two other disability variables (acquired versus 
congenital, and severity) partly offset the effects of condition type. Other things constant, 
those with congenital conditions are more likely to be rehabilitated at closure than those 
with acquired conditions, and relatively more beneficiary clients have congenital 
conditions; the size of the effect is 0.5 percentage points. At the same time, however, the 
more severe an individual’s medical condition, the less likely they are to be rehabilitated 
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at closure, other things constant, and beneficiaries’ conditions are rated as more severe, 
on average. The size of the effect is -0.7 percentage points, making the net effect of these 
two disability variables -0.2 percentage points.  
On net, educational status also increases the percentage for beneficiaries 
rehabilitated relative to non-beneficiaries, by 0.4 percentage points. The results are 
difficult to interpret, however, because of the interaction between level attained and 
special education. Those with a high school degree but no college degree and no special 
education are less likely to be rehabilitated at closure than others, and those with special 
education are more likely to be rehabilitated than others, holding level of education 
constant. 
Age differences also increase the percentage of beneficiaries rehabilitated at 
closure relative to non-beneficiaries, by an estimated 0.2 percentage points. Those age 22 
to 29 are more likely to be rehabilitated at closure, other things constant, and beneficiary 
clients are more likely to be in this age group than others. This is somewhat offset by the 
fact that relatively more beneficiary clients are in the two oldest age groups (50–59 and 
60–64), and clients in these age groups are the least likely to be rehabilitated at closure, 
other things constant.  
Differences in Hispanic ethnicity also increase the percentage rehabilitated for 
beneficiary clients relative to non-beneficiary clients, by an estimated 0.2 percentage 
points. Relative to non-Hispanics, Hispanics are less likely to be rehabilitated at closure, 
other things constant, and there are relatively fewer Hispanics among beneficiary clients 
than among other clients.  
6. Closure Job Characteristics 
A. Descriptive Statistics 
In this section we focus on the employment of clients whose cases were closed as 
rehabilitated (status 26). It is important to note first, however, that some clients who were 
served but whose cases were closed as not-rehabilitated (status 28) were also employed at 
closure. This sometimes happens, for instance, when a client stops cooperating or cannot 
be contacted. Unfortunately, the LSVRSP has little information about employment at 
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closure for such individuals. As will be seen in the next section, findings from the follow-
up survey, which does collect information on employment for status 28 closures, suggests 
that the employment activity of the not-rehabilitated group might be substantial. 
We found that the jobs at closure held by successfully rehabilitated beneficiary 
clients are much less remunerative than those held by rehabilitated non-beneficiary 
clients. While 84.1 percent of rehabilitated non-beneficiary clients were reported to have 
competitive jobs or be self employed, only 59.4 percent of rehabilitated beneficiary 
clients were in one of these categories (Exhibit 6.1). Significantly larger shares of 
rehabilitated beneficiary clients were reported to be in sheltered workshops, supported 
employment, or unpaid family/homemaker positions.  
We conducted additional analysis of job characteristics for the sub-sample of 
rehabilitated clients with paid jobs who also had completed the closure job component of 
the survey (Exhibit 6.2). For this group, beneficiary clients were working many fewer 
hours per week on average (26.5 versus 35.8 hours) and had substantially lower average 
hourly wages ($6.56 versus $9.12, after adjustment for inflation) than non-beneficiary 
clients. As a result, mean earnings per month for non-beneficiaries were much higher 
than for beneficiaries ($1,455 versus $801, after adjustment for inflation).  
The substantial gainful activity (SGA) level of earnings, as defined by SSA, is a 
critical earnings value for beneficiary clients because earnings above that amount can 
trigger an SSA review of medical eligibility for benefits. For SSDI beneficiaries, earnings 
above SGA for more than nine months (the Trial Work Period) would very likely mean 
loss of all benefits.13 During the survey period, SGA was set at $500 per month (not 
inflation adjusted) for all beneficiaries except blind beneficiaries; SGA for the latter, 
which is adjusted for inflation, was over $900 for all of the relevant period. Of 
rehabilitated beneficiaries with earnings, less than half (45.5 percent) reported monthly 
earnings above SGA at closure, compared to 81.6 percent for non-beneficiaries.  
                                                 
13 During the study period, months with earnings above $350 (after any disregards) were 
counted toward the TWP; i.e. it was not necessary to earn above SGA ($500) to use up a 
TWP month. Once the TWP months were exhausted, however, benefits would terminate 
only if monthly earnings net of disregards exceeded SGA. 
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We also found that rehabilitated beneficiary clients with paid jobs were 
significantly less likely than their non-beneficiary counterparts to be in professional 
occupations, and more likely to have service or bench work jobs.  
Regardless of beneficiary status, most rehabilitated clients with paid jobs did not 
have employer health insurance, and beneficiary clients are only about half as likely as 
non-beneficiary clients to have reported employer-provided insurance (16.9 percent 
versus 33.8 percent). 
B. Multivariate Analysis 
We conducted multivariate analyses to determine the extent to which the large 
differences between key closure job characteristics for rehabilitated beneficiary and non-
beneficiary clients could be accounted for by characteristics observed at application other 
than beneficiary status. In the first stage of this analysis, we estimated models for whether 
the closure job is competitive (including self-employed), and whether the job is paid (left-
hand side of Exhibit 6.3). In the second stage, we considered those with paid jobs only 
and estimated models for: hourly earnings, hours worked, monthly earnings, employer 
health insurance, earnings above SGA, and professional, managerial or technical (PMT) 
occupation. 
For rehabilitated clients with complete data on applicant characteristics, the 
percentage of non-beneficiary clients placed in competitive jobs or self employment is 
24.4 percentage points higher than for beneficiary clients (Exhibit 6.3, left-hand panel). A 
substantial share of this difference is due to differences in other applicant characteristics. 
The disability variables account for 10.3 percentage points of the difference, including 
7.2 for disability type and 2.5 for severity. After adjusting for these and other applicant 
characteristics, the remaining difference is 10.1 percentage points – a substantial figure, 
even though it is less than half of the difference before adjustment. 
For this same group, we found that the difference between the percentage with 
paid employment is small before adjustment (2.8 percentage points lower for 
beneficiaries), and all of this relatively small difference can be explained by differences 
in other characteristics. Differences in disability characteristics account for a 6.5 
percentage point difference, differences in employment experience account for another 
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2.1 percentage points. These are partially offset by differences in other characteristics, 
especially living in other than a private residence (-5.9 percentage points) . 
For those rehabilitated clients who work for pay, characteristics at application 
other than beneficiary status explain a substantial share of the differences between mean 
hourly wages, hours worked, and monthly earnings, but substantial differences remain 
after controlling for those characteristics (Exhibit 6.3, middle panel). Differences in the 
disability variables account for a substantial shares of the unadjusted differences. Smaller 
shares are accounted for by work experience, marital status and education. More 
specifically :  
• Mean hourly wages for the beneficiaries are 36.4 percent lower than for the non-
beneficiaries before controlling for other characteristics, and 19.4 percent lower 
afterward. The disability variables account for 7.9 percentage points of the unadjusted 
difference. 
• Mean hours worked for beneficiaries are 37.3 percent lower than for non-
beneficiaries before controlling for other characteristics, and 26.2 percentage points 
lower afterward. The disability variables account for 7.9 percentage points of the 
unadjusted difference. 
• Mean monthly earnings for the beneficiaries are 73.7 percent lower than for the non-
beneficiaries before controlling for other characteristics, and 45.6 percent lower 
afterward. These differences reflect the sum of the differences for hour wages and 
hours worked.14  
 We also found that other characteristics at application, especially the disability 
variables, explained substantial shares of the differences between rehabilitated 
beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries with paid jobs for the three categorical variables we 
examined – employer health insurance, earnings above SGA, and PMT occupation (right-
hand panel of Exhibit 6.3). Before adjustments, the differences for these variables are all 
                                                 
14 The percentage difference in mean monthly earnings explained by each variable would 
be identically equal to the sum of the corresponding figures for hours worked and hourly 
earnings were it not for small differences in the samples used to calculate the three sets of 
estimates. 
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large (22.2, 41.5 and 11.7 percentage points, respectively). For both health insurance and 
earnings above SGA, substantial estimated differences remain after controlling for other 
characteristics (12.9 and 25.1 percentage points, respectively), but for PMT occupation 
the remaining difference is small (1.6 percentage points). 
7.  Employment at Follow-up 
A. Paid and Competitive Employment 
In this section we examine the follow-up employment status of clients who 
received services (26 and 28 closures). We first consider two outcomes, paid employment 
and competitive employment. We then consider job characteristics for those with paid 
employment. 
Comparisons of employment outcomes at follow-up to employment outcomes at 
closure are interesting, but are complicated by two data problems. The first is the lack of 
comparable employment data at closure for those who receive services but are not 
rehabilitated (28 closures). That is, we can observe paid employment and competitive 
employment at follow-up for both status 26 and status 28 closures, but employment 
characteristics for paid jobs at closure was only collected for those with status 26 
closures. To address this issue, we consider both a) the joint outcomes “rehabilitated (at 
closure) and paid employment (at follow-up),” and “rehabilitated and competitive 
employment” for all clients served, which can be observed at both closure and follow-up, 
and b) the percentages in “paid employment” and “competitive employment” at follow-
up for all status 26 and 28 cases. 
 The second problem is attrition bias – not all respondents to the closure survey 
also responded to the follow-up survey, and we found that those who responded were 
more likely to be in paid or competitive employment at closure than those who did not. 
To address this issue, we recomputed the two joint outcomes at closure using just the 
sample with follow-up data, then used the difference between this result and the result 
obtained using the larger sample for those with complete data at closure to adjust the 
follow-up results for attrition bias. 
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The top panel of Exhibit 7.1 presents the findings for paid employment. The first 
important finding is that substantial numbers of both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries 
who received services but were closed as not rehabilitated had paid jobs at follow-up. For 
beneficiaries, this can be seen by comparing the 53.3 percent of the served clients with 
complete data who had paid jobs at follow-up to the 47.7 percent who had paid jobs and 
had been closed as rehabilitated. The corresponding figures for non-beneficiaries are 69.8 
percent and 61.8 percent. The findings presented in the next paragraph make it likely that 
paid employment at follow-up of those closed as not rehabilitated reflects unobserved 
employment at closure, rather than jobs obtained after closure. 
The next finding is that there is a substantial decline in paid employment among 
both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries closed as rehabilitated from closure to follow-up. 
For served beneficiary clients with complete follow-up data, 57.9 percent were closed as 
rehabilitated and had paid jobs at closure; this figure declines to 47.7 percent at follow-
up. The corresponding figures for non-beneficiaries are 72.9 percent and 61.8 percent.  
 As indicated earlier, there is evidence of attrition bias, for both beneficiaries and 
non-beneficiaries. For both groups, the percentage rehabilitated and having paid jobs at 
closure is several points higher in the sample with complete data (i.e., at application, 
closure and follow-up) than in the larger sample that includes observations with 
incomplete follow-up data (57.9 percent versus 53.4 percent for beneficiaries and 72.9 
percent versus 68.3 percent for non-beneficiaries). We adjust the beneficiary and non-
beneficiary estimate for percentage rehabilitated and paid at follow-up by the ratio of the 
second figure in the relevant pair to the first. The same ratios are applied to the estimates 
of percentage paid at follow-up.15 The attrition adjustments have very little effect on the 
differences between beneficiary and non-beneficiary estimates. 
We also conducted a logit analysis of paid employment at follow-up for those 
served (including those not rehabilitated) to assess the extent to which the difference 
between the percentages for beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries would remain after 
accounting for other characteristics at application. Of the 16.5 percentage point difference 
(before adjustment for attrition), 7.5 percentage points (somewhat less than half) remains 
                                                 
15 For example, for beneficiaries the adjusted estimate for percentage paid is 49.2 = 53.3 x 
53.4/57.9.  
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after controlling for other characteristics at application. The characteristics accounting for 
substantial shares of the difference are similar to those that account for differences in the 
percentages of beneficiary and non-beneficiary rehabilitated clients with paid work at 
closure (compare the first column of Exhibit 7.2 to the second column of Exhibit 6.3). 
After adjusting the percentage of served non-beneficiary clients with paid follow-up 
employment for differences in characteristics at application, we further adjust it for 
attrition, applying the same factor as for the percentage of served non-beneficiary clients 
with paid follow-up employment. After adjustment for both factors, the difference in the 
percentage with paid follow-up employment is 7.7 percentage points.  
The lower half of Exhibit 7.1 contains the analogous analysis for competitive 
employment and the second column of Exhibit 7.2 contains the corresponding logit 
analysis for this outcome. Findings are qualitatively similar to those for paid employment 
at follow-up. As at closure, the difference in percentages for competitive employment at 
follow-up is larger than for paid employment, reflecting relatively large numbers of 
beneficiary clients placed in supported or sheltered jobs. After adjustment for attrition 
bias, the difference in the percentage in competitive employment is 26.9 percentage 
points, and adjustment for characteristics at application reduces the difference to 15.6 
percentage points.  
B. Characteristics of Paid Employment 
For served clients employed in paid positions at follow-up, there are large 
differences between beneficiary and non-beneficiary mean job characteristics at follow-
up, always in favor of non-beneficiaries (Exhibit 7.3). Differences are larger than for the 
corresponding characteristics for paid jobs at closure, but they are not directly 
comparable because statistics for paid employment at follow-up include jobs held by 
some beneficiaries who were served but were closed as not rehabilitated, in contrast to 
the statistics for paid employment at closure; They might also be affected by attrition 
bias.  
To assess the extent to which these two factors contribute to the larger differences 
at follow-up, we present a comparison of characteristics for paid jobs at closure and 
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follow-up that takes these differences into account (Exhibit 7.4). The analysis presented 
is parallel to the analysis for paid and competitive employment presented in Exhibit 7.2. 
Attrition bias is apparently not as substantial as it is for the percentages with paid 
or competitive employment, but for four of the variables the bias for beneficiaries is 
opposite in sign of that for non-beneficiaries (hourly wages, hours per week, monthly 
earning, and earnings above SGA). As a result, the adjustments for attrition bias 
somewhat reduce the differences in characteristics for paid jobs at follow-up. After 
adjustment for attrition and for differences in characteristics at application, we estimate 
that hourly earnings at follow-up for beneficiary clients with paid jobs were 25.2 percent 
lower than for the corresponding non-beneficiary clients, hours worked were 26.9 percent 
lower, and monthly earnings were 52.0 percent lower. The analogously adjusted 
difference in percentage with employer health insurance is 19.3 percentage points, the 
difference in percentage with earnings above SGA is 17.9 percentage points, and the 
difference in percentage with PMT jobs is 3.4 percentage points. 
For rehabilitated clients with complete data, the logarithmic means of hourly 
earnings, hours per week, and monthly earnings at follow-up are slightly higher than the 
corresponding values at closure, for both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. For the 
same sample we also see substantial increases in the percentage with health insurance, 
earnings above SGA, and PMT occupations, for both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, 
except the increase in the percentage with earnings above SGA is observed only for 
beneficiaries.  
Mean follow-up job characteristics for all served clients with paid jobs (including 
those closed as not rehabilitated) are very close to those for rehabilitated clients with paid 
jobs only. After adjustment for attrition bias, we find that, for served clients with paid 
jobs at follow-up: 
• Mean hourly earnings were 45.3 percent lower for beneficiaries than for non-
beneficiaries, before adjustment for characteristics at application; after adjustment, 
the difference is lower, but still high, at 25.2 percent. 
• On average, beneficiaries worked fewer hours per week: 37.6 percent fewer before 
adjustment for characteristics at application, and 26.9 percent after adjustment. 
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• The percent difference in mean monthly earnings is 82.9 percent, before adjustment 
for characteristics at application, and 52.0 percent after adjustment.    
• The percentage of beneficiaries in paid jobs who have health insurance is 23.8 
percentage points below the corresponding figure for non-beneficiaries before 
adjustment for characteristics at application, and 19.3 percentage points lower after 
adjustment. 
• The percentage of beneficiaries in paid jobs who have earnings above SGA is 34.8 
percentage points below the corresponding figure for non-beneficiaries before 
adjustment for characteristics at application, and 17.9 percentage points below after 
adjustment. 
• The percentage of beneficiaries in paid jobs who have professional, managerial or 
technical (PMT) occupations is 10.9 percentage points below the corresponding 
percentage for non-beneficiaries before adjustment for characteristics at application, 
and 3.4 percentage points after adjustment. 
In Exhibit 7.5 we show the extent to which differences in client characteristics at 
application account for differences between paid job characteristics at follow-up. For 
each job characteristic, the disability variables account for a substantial share of the 
difference in outcomes – especially the disability type variables. For monthly earnings, 
for instance, the disability variables together account for 12.5 percentage points of the 
difference, including 10.5 percentage points accounted for by disability type.  
8.  Paid Employment and Earnings over 15 Months   
The analysis of the previous two sections examines client employment outcomes 
at two points in time: closure and follow-up (approximately 12 months after closure). In 
this section, we consider two employment outcomes over the 15 month period that begins 
in the second month before the closure month and ends in the 12th month after the 
closure month: number of months with paid employment, and number of months with 
earnings above SGA. The reason for the latter analysis is indicated in the introduction: 
SSDI beneficiaries lose their benefits if they achieve earnings above the SGA level for 
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nine months unless they have disregards for certain expenditures. Hence, it is interesting 
to consider the extent to which beneficiary clients in the sample made progress toward 
nine months of earnings above SGA, and to compare their progress toward that of non-
beneficiaries.  
Unfortunately, the data do not provide adequate information to determine 
employment status or earnings relative to SGA in each month during this period, even for 
those with follow-up interviews. As indicated earlier, the closure employment data for 
served clients closed as not rehabilitated is very limited. In some cases the follow-up 
interview occurred before the end of the 15-month period. In other cases, changes in 
employment or earnings occurred between the exit month and the follow-up interview 
that were not captured by the study instruments.  
To compensate for these limitations, the analysis in this section considers the 
relationship between the outcome of interest (e.g., months of employment) and number of 
months for which we observe the outcome during the 15-month period. Further, we only 
consider outcomes for clients who were closed as rehabilitated (status 26) and who 
responded to the follow-up survey. For such respondents, we were able to determine 
employment status and earnings relative to SGA for at least 9 months in 87.8 percent of 
cases all; beneficiary status did not significantly affect the likelihood of observing these 
outcomes. We are able to observe these outcomes for 15 months for 37.4 percent of these 
clients, and again there is no significant difference in the percentage observed by 
beneficiary status. 
Holding months observed constant, mean months worked for beneficiary clients 
closed as rehabilitated is usually below that for non-beneficiary clients (Exhibit 8.1), 
although there is considerable variation in the difference with number of months 
observed because of the small sample sizes at each number. For those observed from 13 
to 15 months there is clearly a significant difference between the percentage for 
beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, but the difference is just half a month for the large 
number of respondents that we can observe for a full 15 months.  
Our estimates for the percentage with earnings above SGA for at least nine 
months (Exhibit 8.2) are adjusted for attrition bias, based on the adjustment applied to the 
estimates for the percentages of rehabilitated clients with paid jobs who have earnings 
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above SGA at follow-up.16 The estimated percentages of rehabilitated non-beneficiary 
clients with earnings above SGA for at least nine months are substantial after nine 
months and, apart from sampling variation, increase through 15 months. For those 
observed for 15 months the estimate is 83.0 percent. The corresponding estimates for 
rehabilitated beneficiary clients are roughly half as large; the estimate at 15 months is 
42.2 percent, 40.8 percentage points below the value for non-beneficiaries.  
We also conducted a logit analysis of earnings above SGA for nine or more 
months to assess the extent to which differences between beneficiaries and non-
beneficiaries can be accounted for by differences in characteristics at application, again 
confining our attention to clients with complete data who were closed as rehabilitated. 
We included in the sample only those for whom we can determine earnings relative to 
SGA for at least nine months, and also included the number of months for which we 
could observe this outcome as an explanatory variable (see Appendix Exhibit 6.1).  
The model yields estimates of the percentages of rehabilitated beneficiaries and 
non-beneficiaries achieving nine or more months of earnings above SGA in the 15-month 
period.17 The estimates, which have been adjusted for attrition, are 39.7 and 74.2 percent, 
respectively. We estimate that just over half of the 34.5 percentage point difference 
between the two estimates is accounted for by differences in characteristics at 
application, leaving a difference of 19.0 percentage points accounted for by beneficiary 
status. 
As indicated earlier, the fact that a respondent has achieved earnings above SGA 
for nine or more months does not necessarily mean that the respondent has exited the 
SSDI or SSI programs. It appears, however, that many who have achieved that milestone 
did exit. In the sample of served clients with complete data at follow-up as well as earlier, 
                                                 
16 Specifically, we multiplied each month’s unadjusted estimate for beneficiaries (non-
beneficiaries) by the ratio of the adjusted to unadjusted estimates for the percentage of 
paid follow-up jobs with earnings above SGA for beneficiaries (non-beneficiaries), using 
the data for rehabilitated clients only (see Exhibit 7.4).  
17 Technically, the estimates for this percentage vary with the number of months that are 
observed for the individual in the 15-month period. The estimates reported represent 
estimates for the average individual in the sample, who was observed for 12.5 months. 
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25.8 percent reported that they were not receiving benefits at follow-up.18 This estimate 
is likely biased upward by a few percentage points due to sample attrition.19 Even so, it 
would not be far below the estimated 26.1 percent who reported earnings above SGA at 
the same point, and would be close to the estimated 22.6 percent of rehabilitated 
beneficiary clients reporting earnings above SGA for at least nine months – both of which 
are adjusted for attrition bias. Given these estimates and the fact that SSI recipients can 
earn somewhat more than SGA and retain some SSI benefits indefinitely, the percentage 
of served beneficiary clients who are employed and not receiving benefits at follow-up is 
remarkably high. Unless benefit receipt is substantially misreported, it appears that the 
percentage of served beneficiary clients who eventually leave the rolls for at least some 
period because of earnings is at least 20 percent.20
9.  Summary and Conclusion 
We begin by summarizing the findings concerning the differences between 
outcomes for beneficiary and non-beneficiary applicants at every stage of the VR service 
process through 12 months after closure, then turn to a discussion of their implications 
for policy and future research.  
First, we consider the percentages of applicants who were determined eligible and 
who received services (Exhibit 9.1). The base of each of these figures is applicants; each 
percentage served was calculated by multiplying the corresponding percentage eligible by 
percentage served for those determined eligible.  
During the period when the data were collected, there was no significant 
difference in the likelihood that beneficiary and non-beneficiary applicants for services 
would be determined eligible for services. Beneficiary applicants were somewhat less 
                                                 
18 Another 4.4 percent reported that they were neither working for pay nor receiving 
benefits. 
19 We cannot assess the extent to which follow-up attrition affects benefit status at 
follow-up because we do not observe benefit status at closure; even if we did, the 
adjustment method used for the employment outcomes might not work well because it is 
likely that many of those earning above SGA at closure were still receiving benefits 
because of the Trial Work Period and the Section 1619 program.  
20 This includes beneficiary clients who leave the rolls and return to work because of a 
substantial improvement in their medical condition as well as those who do so despite no 
substantial improvement. 
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likely to be served, however, because those found eligible were less likely to actually 
receive services. Thus, although beneficiary applicants are more likely to be determined 
eligible, overall they are less likely to be served; 72.6 percent of beneficiary applicants 
receive services, versus 75.4 percent of non-beneficiary applicants. Controlling for 
differences in characteristics at application increases the difference in the percentage 
served, from 2.8 percentage points to 3.6 percentage points. 
For the remainder of this section we consider outcomes for those who received 
services beyond their eligibility determination (i.e., those closed in status 26 or 28). From 
a policy perspective, those served are of special interest because the services they receive 
account for most VR agency expenditures. For those served, we found significant and 
substantial differences between beneficiary and non-beneficiary outcomes at every stage. 
Although substantial shares of these differences could be explained by differences in 
other characteristics at application, substantial differences remain after adjusting for those 
characteristics. 
Estimates of key outcomes for beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, adjusted for 
attrition bias only, are presented in Exhibit 9.2. Starting from the bottom and moving to 
the top, the outcomes are: 
• The percentage of served clients who are rehabilitated; 
• Three measures of the percentage of served clients who obtain paid jobs. The first 
(lowest) of these is the percentage who are classified as rehabilitated at closure and 
who have paid jobs.21 The second (middle) is comparable to the first, but refers to the 
follow-up job, approximately 12 months after closure. The third (top) is the 
percentage of all served clients (including clients not rehabilitated) who have paid 
jobs at follow-up, and is larger than the second because some clients who were not 
rehabilitated had paid jobs; 
• Three measures of the percentage of served clients who obtain competitive jobs – 
excluding unpaid jobs, sheltered workshop jobs, and supported employment jobs. The 
three measures are defined analogously to those for paid jobs. 
                                                 
21 As discussed earlier comparable information for those classified as not rehabilitated is 
unavailable. 
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• Four measures of the percentage of served clients who receive earnings above SGA. 
The lowest three are analogous to the measures for paid and competitive employment. 
The fourth (top) is the percentage with earnings above SGA for nine or more months 
out of the 12-month period beginning three months before closure.  
As discussed in the previous section, although we do not have definitive data, it 
appears that the percentage of served beneficiaries who are employed and have exited the 
benefit rolls at follow-up is just slightly lower than the estimate of the percentage with 
earnings above SGA at follow-up (i.e., about 20 percent). 
Not surprisingly, as we move from the bottom outcome measure to the top, the 
percentage of each group attaining the outcome generally declines; many clients have 
medical issues, as well as other personal challenges, that are likely to limit their 
employment success over long periods. It is also not surprising that attainment of these 
outcomes is lower for beneficiaries than non-beneficiaries. What is most striking is that 
the decline from the percentage achieving the lowest outcomes to the percentage 
achieving the highest outcomes is much greater for beneficiaries than for non-
beneficiaries. Whereas the difference in the percentage rehabilitated (bottom outcome) is 
13.7 percentage points (56.9 percent for beneficiaries versus 70.6 percent for non-
beneficiaries), the difference in the percentage with earnings above SGA for at least 9 
months (top outcome) is more than twice as large on a smaller base -- 29.8 percentage 
points (22.6 percent versus 52.4 percent). 
A substantial share of the observed difference in each outcome is accounted for 
by differences in other client characteristics at application, as shown in Exhibit 9.3 (white 
sections of the bars), and the amount accounted for in this fashion is generally larger for 
the outcomes at the top of the list than for the outcomes at the bottom. We find that prior 
work experience, especially since disability onset, and disability characteristics are the 
most important contributors to differences in outcomes.  
Even after accounting for differences in characteristics at application, we find 
substantial differences in outcomes, especially for those at the top of the list. Thus, while 
the remaining difference in the percentage rehabilitated at closure is estimated at 10.7 
percentage points, the remaining difference in the percentage with earnings above SGA 
for at least nine months is 17.1 percentage points. 
33 
What accounts for the remaining differences in outcomes? It might be that the 
characteristics captured by the LSVRSP data, despite their richness relative to 
characteristics available in other data sets, nonetheless fail to capture important 
differences between beneficiary and non-beneficiary clients that could account for the 
remaining differences.  
Although we think that unobserved differences in characteristics probably do 
account for some of the remaining differences, it also seems unlikely that unmeasured 
characteristics could account for all of the remaining differences for the earnings 
outcomes. 
The leading alternative explanation for the differences in outcomes not accounted 
for by differences in characteristics at application are the work disincentives associated 
with the income support programs, including their related health insurance benefits. That 
explanation is certainly consistent with the finding that the differences not accounted for 
are largest for the measures relating earnings to SGA. As discussed in the introduction, 
SSDI beneficiaries have a strong incentive to keep their earnings below SGA, and SSI 
recipients have a weaker, although significant, incentive to do the same.  
The fact that most clients who obtain paid jobs did not obtain jobs with employer 
health insurance adds credibility to the incentive hypothesis. The difficulty that clients 
face in obtaining jobs with health insurance substantially increases the incentive for 
beneficiary clients to maintain their eligibility for benefits. It might also be that 
beneficiary clients who intend to maintain their eligibility may be more willing than non-
beneficiary clients to accept jobs that do not offer health insurance, helping to explain the 
substantial difference in the percentage of paid jobs with health insurance for beneficiary 
and non-beneficiary clients with paid jobs at both closure and follow-up. 
The differences between beneficiary and non-beneficiary outcomes after 
controlling for other characteristics at application might also understate, rather than 
overstate, the potential effect of disincentives on employment outcomes for beneficiaries, 
because the outcomes for non-beneficiaries might also substantially reflect the effects of 
work disincentives, for two reasons. First, a substantial number of non-beneficiary clients 
were receiving income support from other sources that create work disincentives at the 
time they applied for services. As discussed in Section 3, 28.1 percent of non-beneficiary 
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clients were receiving support from some public or private source, including 18.9 percent 
who said that such income was their primary source of support. This group includes 6.7 
percent who were receiving AFDC benefits and 3.9 percent who were receiving workers 
compensation indemnity payments, among others.  
Second, some clients who were non-beneficiaries at application for VR services 
were apparently in the process of obtaining benefits, or entered that process shortly 
thereafter. We do not have direct information on application activity, but we do know that 
14.6 percent of non-beneficiaries who received services and who also responded to the 
follow-up survey said they were receiving SSDI or SSI benefits at the time of the follow-
up survey.22 During the application process, this group had stronger incentives to conceal 
their ability to achieve earnings above SGA. Achievement of earnings above SGA during 
the application period would preclude them from SSDI or SSI eligibility entirely; the 
SSDI and SSI work incentive provisions only apply to those who have already been 
found eligible for these programs.  
Although our findings leave a substantial role for disincentives created by the 
SSDI and SSI programs and their associated health benefits in determining employment 
outcomes for beneficiaries, more empirical research is required to establish that the effect 
of these disincentives is very substantial. This is a very important issue from a policy 
perspective, in at least two ways.  
First, disincentives might have a very negative impact on the success of VR 
delivery of services to beneficiaries, and addressing disincentives might greatly improve 
VR performance. VR agencies have often been criticized for not helping more 
beneficiaries to become economically independent (i.e., exit the SSDI and SSI rolls). 
Dissatisfaction with the performance of state VR agencies in this regard was a driving 
force behind establishment of the Ticket to Work program under the 1999 Ticket to Work 
and Work Incentives Improvement Act. Ticket to Work adds two payment systems to the 
previously existing system used by SSA to pay state VR agencies for services provided to 
beneficiaries, and also makes both new payment systems available to qualified private 
providers (Employment Networks, or ENs).  
                                                 
22 This estimate is not adjusted for possible attrition bias. The likely direction of bias is 
unclear. 
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These changes were intended to both encourage competition between providers 
(both VR agencies and ENs) and provide much stronger incentives for providers to help 
beneficiaries exit the SSDI and SSI programs. The Ticket program is built on the premise 
that, with financial encouragement, VR agencies and/or the ENs can improve the 
employment outcomes of beneficiaries who receive VR services by enough so that more 
will exit the program rolls. If disincentives created by the structure of SSDI and SSI 
benefits are an important reason for relatively poor outcomes for beneficiary clients, then 
a) past criticism of VR performance was at least somewhat misplaced because the 
disincentives are external to VR, and b) VR agencies and ENs might achieve success 
under the new payment systems by pursuing strategies that address these disincentives.  
Although the disincentives are external to VR, providers do have some 
opportunities to address them, several of which were introduced or expanded under the 
1999 Ticket Act. In states that have introduced Medicaid Buy-in programs, providers can 
help SSDI and SSI beneficiary clients take advantage of the opportunity these programs 
offer to workers with disabilities. In all states, providers can make clients aware of SSDI 
and SSI work incentive provisions that allow former beneficiaries to continue receipt of 
Medicare or Medicaid. Providers can also convert SSA’s outcome payments, made under 
the new payment systems only after clients exit the rolls, into income or in-kind benefits 
for the client.23  
In general, helping clients address program disincentives as they return to work is 
itself a potentially valuable vocational rehabilitation service. The establishment of SSA’s 
Benefits Planning and Outreach Grants (BPAO) program under the Ticket Act recognizes 
this potential. If it can be established that providing this service does, indeed, increase 
program exits, given the limited scope for such services under current law, then 
regulatory and legislative changes that would effectively expand the scope of such 
                                                 
23 One EN has pursued this strategy as its only service, with some success. This strategy 
might be especially effect for beneficiaries with relatively low benefits, because 
outcomes payments do not depend on the size of the individual’s benefits; they are fixed 
at 40 percent of average monthly SSDI for SSDI beneficiaries, or 40 percent of average 
monthly SSI benefits for SSI recipients who are not SSDI beneficiaries. Others have paid 
smaller monthly stipends to secure monthly documentation of earnings above SGA. To 
our knowledge, VR agencies have not used this strategy (see Thornton et al., 2004, p. 
108). 
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services might well be warranted (e.g., increases in the size of outcome payments, 
increased support for Medicaid Buy-in programs, and removal of restrictions that might 
prevent providers from passing outcome payments on to clients who leave the rolls in the 
form of cash or in-kind benefits). If incentives matter, we should also find that the 
reduction in disincentives that will be tested under SSA’s Benefit Offset Demonstration 
for SSDI beneficiaries will improve employment outcomes for both VR and EN 
beneficiary clients.24     
This last point hints at the second policy reason for studying the effects of the 
disincentives created by the SSDI and SSI programs for beneficiary clients: to assess the 
possible effects of changes to those disincentives on the employment and earnings of 
beneficiaries and potential beneficiaries. If we could determine the extent to which post-
VR earnings of beneficiary clients are affected by specific reductions in the disincentives, 
then we could infer the effects of a variety of proposed changes to the disincentives on 
VR clients. The implications of strong effects would extend well beyond the implications 
for those who receive VR services under the current system. If the disincentive effects are 
strong, then reductions in disincentives might have substantial positive effects on the 
employment and earnings of many beneficiaries (and potential beneficiaries) other than 
those who would use VR services under our current system. Those are the outcomes that 
policymakers seek to achieve under the Benefit Offset Demonstration. It remains to be 
seen whether the changes that will be tested will be sufficient to have a substantial 
impact. Although the innovation to be tested under the Demonstration reduces 
disincentives in a substantial way, Demonstration beneficiaries will lose one dollar of 
benefits for every two dollars earned above SGA – the equivalent of a 50 percent tax rate.        
Two recently funded projects will use RSA administrative data to produce 
rigorous estimates of how past reductions in disincentives have affected VR outcomes for 
beneficiary clients. The first will examine the impacts of SSA’s 1999 increase in SGA, 
from the $500 level that had been in place since 1990, to $700 on July 1, 1999, followed 
                                                 
24 Under this demonstration, authorized by the 1999 Ticket Act, SSA will eliminate the 
SSDI earnings cliff at SGA for beneficiaries who are not also SSI recipients; instead, 
these beneficiaries will lose one dollar of benefits for every two dollars earned above 
SGA. 
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by smaller increases, indexed to inflation, thereafter (the 2004 value is $810). The second 
will examine the impacts of the introduction of state Medicaid Buy-in programs since 
1999.25  
                                                 
25 Both studies have been funded by NIDRR under Cornell’s Rehabilitation Research and 
Training Center for Employment Policy. The SGA study will be conducted by Stapleton 
and Jasmin Sethi of Harvard University. The Medicaid Buy-in study will be conducted by 
Gina Livermore and Kosali Simon of Cornell. 
38 
References 
Goodman, N. and G.A. Livermore (2004). “The Effectiveness of Medicaid Buy-in 
Programs in Promoting the Employment of People with Disabilities.” Prepared 
for the Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Advisory Panel. 
Hayward, B. and H. Schmidt-Davis (2003a) Longitudinal Study of the Vocational 
Rehabilitation Services Program, Final Report 1: How Consumer Characteristics 
affect Access to, Receipt of and Outcomes of VR Services. Report from RTI 
International to the Rehabilitation Services Administration, Department of 
Education. 
Hayward, B. and H. Schmidt-Davis (2003b) Longitudinal Study of the Vocational 
Rehabilitation Services Program, Final Report 2: VR Services and Outcomes. 
Report from RTI International to the Rehabilitation Services Administration, 
Department of Education. 
RTI International (2003) Longitudinal Study of the Vocational Rehabilitation Services 
Program: Users Guide. Report from RTI International to the Rehabilitation 
Services Administration, Department of Education. 
Thornton, C., G. Livermore, D. Stapleton, J. Kregel, T. Silva, B. O’Day, T. Fraker, W.G. 
Revell, Jr., H. Schroeder and M. Edwards (2004), Evaluation of the Ticket to 
Work Program: Initial Evaluation Report. From Mathematica Policy Research and 
the Cornell University Institute for Policy Research to the Social Security 
Administration, February.
39 
Exhibit 2.1.   Terminology for Closure Status
Status 
Code Status Description Ineligible Eligible Served Rehabilitation
8
Closed from referral, applicant, or 
extended evaluation status ?
26
Exited with an employment 
outcome ? ? ?
28
Exited without an employment 
outcome after services ? ?
30
Exited without an employment 
outcome before services ?
38
Post-employment services 
discontinued ? ?
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Exhibit 3.1.   Disability Characteristics of Applicants*
Variable & Category Non-
Beneficiaries Beneficiaries Difference
Severity
Most Severely Disabled 20.5 41.8 -21.2
Severely Disabled 48.5 45.1 3.4
Missing 6.8 6.5 0.3
Functional Status
Low Gross Motor Function 16.5 22.5 -6.0
Low Personal Care Function 10.2 25.9 -15.7
Low Cognitive Function 2.3 4.8 -2.5
Missing 31.1 32.4 -1.3
Congenital or Acquired
Congenital 20.1 27.5 -7.5
Acquired 71.0 64.9 6.1
Missing (not stated) 8.9 7.6 1.3
Primary Disability Category
Orthopedic & Amputations 30.0 19.6 10.4
Area Affected:
Not stated/missing 0.0 0.0 0.0
3+ limbs/entire body impaired 2.6 5.4 -2.8
1 upper & 1 lower limb impaired 1.1 1.7 -0.6
Upper limb(s) impaired 5.5 0.9 4.6
Lower limb(s) impaired 6.7 4.2 2.6
Other 14.1 7.4 6.7
Cause:
Congenital/ill defined 1.5 1.0 0.5
Other diseases   2.5 2.8 -0.3
Arthritis/rheumatism 2.4 1.2 1.2
Intracranial hemorrhage/stroke 0.3 0.9 -0.5
Multiple sclerosis 0.4 1.5 -1.2
Accidents/injuries(Spinal Cord) 3.5 3.3 0.2
Other accidents, injuries, poisonings 18.5 6.9 11.6
Cerebral palsy   1.0 1.9 -0.9
Not determined 0.0 0.1 -0.1
Mental Illness & Substance Abuse   28.1 34.1 -5.9
Psychotic depression 1.8 1.7 0.1
Manic depression 1.6 3.1 -1.6
Schizophrenia, paranoia 0.6 5.1 -4.5
Other psychosis  2.5 6.1 -3.5
Neurosis         3.5 7.1 -3.6
Neurotic depression 2.9 2.1 0.8
Depression (uncategorized) 1.0 0.2 0.8
Other mental illness 4.9 4.8 0.0
Substance abuse  9.4 3.9 5.5
Not determined 1.5 0.2 1.3
Nonorthopedic physical 12.7 12.6 0.1
Mental retardation 4.9 13.1 -8.2
Hearing          7.0 4.3 2.7
Learning disability 10.2 3.8 6.4
Vision impairment 3.5 7.6 -4.2
Traumatic brain injury 2.2 4.7 -2.5
Missing 1.5 0.2 1.3
*Based on applicant cohort sample only (1,796 non-beneficiaries and 505 beneficiaries).
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Exhibit 3.2.   Demographic Characteristics of Applicants*
Variable & Category Non-
Beneficiaries Beneficiaries Difference
Age
<=21 21.5 15.4 6.0
22-29 15.7 13.5 2.2
30-39 27.3 30.5 -3.2
40-49 22.8 28.2 -5.4
50-59 11.2 10.5 0.7
60-64 1.5 1.9 -0.4
Percent Male 52.6 52.4 0.3
Race
White 83.2 74.5 8.7
Black 14.3 23.2 -8.8
American Indian /Alaskan Native 0.6 0.3 0.3
Asian or Pacific Islander 0.8 1.5 -0.6
Missing 1.0 0.5 0.5
Percent Hispanic 10.7 6.7 4.0
Marital Status
Married       30.2 17.9 12.3
Widowed       1.6 3.5 -1.9
Divorced      17.3 18.3 -1.0
Separated     6.1 4.7 1.5
Never Married 44.0 55.4 -11.5
Missing 0.8 0.3 0.5
Dependents
None 49.1 59.7 -10.5
1 24.6 22.5 2.0
 2-3 19.7 14.2 5.5
>3 5.4 3.0 2.4
Missing 1.3 0.7 0.6
*Based on applicant cohort sample only (1,796 non-beneficiaries and 505 beneficiaries).
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DExhibit 3.3.   Education at Application*
Highest Degree
Full Sample No Special Education Special Education Special Education Unknown
Non-
Bene. Bene. Diff.
Non-
Bene. Bene. Diff.
Non-
Bene. Bene. Diff.
Non-
Bene. Bene. Diff.
All degree categories 98.5 96.8 1.7 65.2 52.5 12.7 15.3 21.3 -6.0 18.0 23.0 -4.9
<12yrs educ      25.2 26.3 -1.1 11.2 8.4 2.9 7.8 9.7 -1.9 6.2 8.3 -2.1
12+yrs,no degree noted 6.1 7.1 -1.0 3.7 3.8 -0.1 0.7 1.0 -0.3 1.8 2.3 -0.5
High School Diploma/GE 56.2 52.6 3.6 40.9 31.0 9.8 6.3 10.1 -3.9 9.0 11.4 -2.4
Two-year Associates 4.8 3.9 0.9 4.1 3.2 0.9 0.3 0.5 -0.2 0.5 0.2 0.3
Four-year Bachelors 4.5 5.5 -1.1 3.8 5.1 -1.3 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.5 0.4 0.0
PostGrad Degree  1.7 1.3 0.1 1.6 1.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3 -0.1
*Based on applicant cohort sample only (1,796 non-beneficiaries and 505 beneficiaries).
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Exhibit 3.4.   Work History of Applicants*
Variable & Category Non-
Beneficiaries Beneficiaries Difference
Work status at application
Working 31.7 17.0 14.7
Homemaker/unpaid family worker 7.4 8.3 -0.9
Student 13.9 11.5 2.4
Trainee/volunteer or non-competitive employment 2.1 4.7 -2.6
Not working-Looking for work 19.9 25.1 -5.2
Not working-Not looking for work 14.4 23.3 -8.9
Missing          10.7 10.1 0.6
Work prior to disability onset
Worked 50.7 49.9 0.8
Longest job
Unknown 5.0 5.2 -0.2
Less than 1 yr 40.0 45.5 -5.5
1-2 yrs          11.5 12.3 -0.8
3-5 yrs           12.3 12.1 0.2
6-9 yrs           8.0 7.4 0.7
10 yrs or more    12.3 10.4 1.9
None (includes all with congenital disabilities) 38.5 43.0 -4.6
Missing 10.8 7.1 3.7
Work post disability onset
Worked 58.6 44.9 13.7
Longest job
Unknown 28.8 19.5 9.4
Less than 1 yr 35.5 50.2 -14.6
1-2 yrs          11.8 12.7 -0.9
3-5 yrs           6.4 5.5 0.9
6-9 yrs           3.0 1.7 1.3
10 yrs or more    2.6 1.3 1.3
None 29.6 45.9 -16.3
Missing 11.8 9.2 2.6
Hourly Earnings in Most Recent Job within Last 24 
Months (year 2000 dollars)
Did not work in past 24 months 30.2 52.3 -22.2
Worked but missing earnings 14.1 11.9 2.2
<$3.35 1.2 3.6 -2.4
3.35-3.99 0.4 0.2 0.2
$4-4.99 1.0 2.4 -1.4
$5-5.99 8.3 9.1 -0.8
$6-6.99 10.6 7.1 3.5
$7-9.99 16.9 5.9 11.0
$10-14.99 10.8 4.0 6.8
$15 or more 6.8 3.6 3.2
*Based on applicant cohort sample only (1,796 non-beneficiaries and 505 beneficiaries).
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Exhibit 3.5.   Financial Support of Applicants*
Variable & Category Non-Beneficiaries Beneficiaries Difference
Any Financial Assistance 28.1 100.0 -71.9
Any Public Assistance 17.3 100.0 -82.7
SSI Blind 0.0 3.1 -3.1
SSI Disabled 0.0 66.1 -66.1
SSDI 0.0 45.5 -45.5
SSI or SSDI 0.0 100.0 -100.0
AFDC 6.7 2.3 4.4
Veteran's benefits 1.2 1.1 0.1
Worker's Comp. 3.9 0.4 3.5
Private Insurance 0.6 0.5 0.1
Friends /Family support 7.3 10.8 -3.5
Primary Support 
Missing 0.6 0.4 0.2
Not Asked (no financial assistance) 71.8 0.0 71.8
Self (Earnings) 2.0 2.3 -0.3
Benefits        18.9 87.5 -68.6
Family or Friend 6.8 9.8 -3.0
*Based on applicant cohort sample only (1,796 non-beneficiaries and 505 beneficiaries).
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Exhibit 4.1.   Factors Accounting for the Difference in the Percentage of Applicants 
Determined Eligible and Difference in the Percentage of Eligible Clients Served* 
Variable & Category
Difference in Percentage of:
Applicants 
Determined Eligible
Eligible Clients 
Served
Beneficiary status -1.3 5.5
All work experience variables -0.7 2
Post-onset work experience -0.3 0.4
Prior VR closure 0.3 0
Other work experience variables -0.7 1.5
Marital status 0.3 0.1
Race 0.1 0.1
All disability variables 2.9 -1.9
Disability type 0.9 -0.8
Acquired/congenital 0.1 -0.5
Severity 1.9 -0.5
Education 0.2 0.5
Age 0.2 0
Hispanic ethnicity -0.1 0.1
All other characteristics at application -0.3 -0.4
Total -1.7 4.9
*Based on logit analysis of  a) eligibility for all applicants (Appendix Exhibit 1) and b) 
eligible clients served (Appendix Exhibit 2). 
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Exhibit 5.1.   Percentage of Served Clients Rehabilitated, by Beneficiary Status*
Variable Non-beneficiaries Beneficiaries Difference
Percent rehabilitated of those served
full sample 70.4% 58.2% 12.2
Sample w/ complete applicant characteristics 70.6% 56.9% 13.7
adjusted for applicant characteristics 67.6% 56.9% 10.7
*Full sample includes respondents with served status at closure (4,127 non-beneficiaries and 1,463 
beneficiaries). Sample with complete applicant characteristics includes those who also had complete 
data on characteristics at application (3,289 non-beneficiaries and 1,064 beneficiaries). Adjusted 
estimate for non-beneficiaries is estimate of percentage of non-beneficiary clients who would be 
rehabilitated if their characteristics at application were, on average, the same as those of beneficiaries, 
based on logit analysis of rehabilitation for served clients (Appendix Exhibit 3.1).
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Exhibit 5.2.   Factors Accounting for the Difference in Percentage 
of Served Clients Who Closed as Rehabilitated*
Difference accounted for by: Estimate
Beneficiary Status 10.7
All work experience variables 4.9
Post-onset work experience 2.8
Prior VR closure 0.7
Other work experience variables 1.4
Marital status 1
Race 0.3
All disability variables -2.5
Disability type -2.7
Acquired/congenital -0.5
Severity 0.7
Education -0.4
Age -0.2
Hispanic ethnicity -0.2
All other characteristics at application 0.2
Total 13.7
*Based on logit analysis of rehabilitation for served clients (Appendix 
Exhibit 3.1)
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Exhibit 6.1.   Employment Type at Closure for Rehabilitated Clients, by 
Beneficiary Status*
Employment Type Non-beneficiaries Beneficiaries Difference
Competitive Labor Market 81.0 55.9 25.1
Self-Employment 3.1 3.5 -0.4
Sheltered Workshop 1.5 10.5 -9.0
Supported Employment 2.5 15.6 -13.0
Homemaker 2.7 5.2 -2.5
Unpaid Family Worker 0.2 0.0 0.2
Other 1.2 1.3 -0.2
Missing 7.9 8.1 -0.2
*Based on sample of clients closed as rehabilitated (2,877 non-beneficiaries and 837 
beneficiaries)
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Exhibit 6.2.   Characteristics of Paid Jobs at Closure for Rehabilitated Clients with Paid Jobs, 
by Beneficiary Status*
Variable and Category Non-beneficiaries Beneficiaries Difference
Hours per week
<20hrs/wk   3.5 18.9 -15.4
20-35hrs/wk 25.0 49.9 -24.9
35+hrs/wk   63.7 26.4 37.4
Missing 7.8 4.8 3.0
Mean* 35.8 26.5 9.3
Hourly Wage (inflation adjusted to 2000)
 <$3.35      2.1 13 -10.9
 3.35-3.99   0.7 1.6 -1.0
 $4-4.99     2.0 3.7 -1.8
 $5-5.99     13.9 26.8 -12.9
 $6-6.99     15.9 18.4 -2.5
 $7-9.99     28.6 16.8 11.9
 $10-14.99   17.7 8.7 9.0
 $15 or more 8.5 2.5 6.0
Missing 10.6 8.4 2.2
Mean* $9.12 $6.56 $2.56
Employer Health Insurance Benefit
No 54.6 76.5 -21.9
Yes 33.8 16.9 16.9
Missing 11.6 6.6 5.0
Earnings per Month >$500  (i.e. SGA -- not inflation adjusted)
No 9.5 47.2 -37.7
Yes 81.6 45.5 36.1
Missing 8.9 7.3 1.6
Client to receive ongoing support services at closure
No 95.1 76.5 18.7
Yes 2.6 20.7 -18.1
Missing 2.3 2.8 -0.6
Type of Job
Competitive 89 63.3 25.7
Self-Employment 3.5 4 -0.5
Sheltered Workshop 1.6 11.9 -10.3
Supported Employment 2.8 17.7 -14.9
Other 1.3 1.5 -0.3
Missing 1.9 1.7 0.2
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Exhibit 6.2.   Continued
Variable and Category Non-beneficiaries Beneficiaries Difference
Monthly Earnings (inflation adjusted to 2000)
<$250      1.3 14.1 -12.8
$250-500   3.9 19.5 -15.6
$501-1000  23.2 32.9 -9.7
$1001-1500 27 12.9 14.2
$1501-2000 16 6.4 9.7
$2001-2500 7.4 2.7 4.7
$2500-3000 4.7 1.2 3.5
>$3000     5 1.3 3.7
Missing 11.5 9.1 2.4
Mean* $1,455 $801 $654
Type of Occupation
Prof., Man., or Tech. 24.8 12.5 12.3
Clerical/Sales 23.5 22 1.4
Service 23.5 30.2 -6.8
Ag., Fish., Forest., etc. 2 2 0.0
Processing 1 2 -1.1
Machine Trades 3.9 2.1 1.8
Benchwork 6.4 16.3 -9.8
Structural Work 5.4 2.2 3.1
Miscellaneous 7.6 8.5 -0.9
Missing 2 2.1 -0.1
*Based on sample of clients closed as rehabilitated who had paid jobs         (n = 2,687 non-
beneficiaries and 764 beneficiaries).
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Exhibit 6.3.   Factors Accounting for Differences in Closure Job Characteristics*
Characteristics at Application
Rehabilitated Clients Rehabilitated Clients with Paid Jobs
Percentage Difference in Percent Difference in Mean of Percentage Difference in
Competitive 
Jobs Paid Jobs
Hourly 
Earnings
Hours 
Worked
Monthly 
Earnings**
Health 
Insurance
Above 
SGA
PMT 
Jobs
Beneficiary 10.1 status 0.1 19.4 26.2 45.6 12.9 25.1 1.6
All work experience variables 1.7 2.1 2.3 1 3.3 -0.3 0.8 0.7
Post-onset work experience 0.8 0.7 0.1 0.2 0 0 0 0
Prior VR closure 0.4 0.4 0 0.4 -0.6 0.4 0.4 -0.4
Other work experience variables 0.5 1 1 2.7 0.3 0.3 0.3 -0.3
Marital status 0.2 0 1.6 2.6 1.1 1.2 0.6 -0.6
African American -0.7 -0.3 0.6 -0.3 0.3 0.1 -0.3 0.8
All disability variables 10.3 6.5 7.9 7.9 15.8 5.6 11.6 5.7
Disability type 7.2 5.5 7.4 12.8 5.8 8.2 4.4 -4.4
Acquired/congenital 0.6 0 0.3 1 -0.1 1.4 0.3 -0.3
Severity 2.5 1 2.1 0 1.9 1 -1.9 -1
Education 1.4 0.6 0.9 4 1.8 1.6 1.9 -1.9
Age -0.1 0 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 -0.5 -0.1 0.1
Hispanic ethnicity 0 0.2 0.2 0.1 -0.4 -0.6 0.3 -0.3
All other characteristics at application 1.5 -6.4 -6.4 0.5 2.8 1.8 1.7 0.8
Total 24.4 2.8 36.4 37.3 73.7 22.2 41.5 11.7
*Based on multivariate analyses of paid and competitive employment at closure for rehabilitated clients (Appendix Exhibit 4.1) and  
characteristics of paid jobs for those rehabilitated clients with paid jobs (Appendix Exhibits 4.3 and 4.4).
**Sum of percentages for earnings per hour and hours per month. All percentage changes are computed as changes in natural logarithms.
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Exhibit 7.1.   Paid and Competitive Employment at Closure and Follow-up for Served* Clients, by 
Beneficiary Status, and Adjustments for Attrition Bias
Variable Non-beneficiaries Beneficiaries Difference
Paid Employment
Percent both rehabilitated and having:
Paid employment at closure
sample with applicant characteristics 68.3% 53.4% 14.8
sample with applicant characteristics and follow-up data 72.9% 57.9% 15.1
Paid employment at follow-up
sample with applicant characteristics and follow-up data 61.8% 47.7% 14.2
adjusted for attrition bias 57.9% 44.0% 13.9
adjusted for applicant characteristics 56.2% 47.7% 8.5
adjusted for attrition bias 52.6% 44.0% 8.6
Percent having paid employment at follow-up
sample with applicant characteristics and follow-up data 69.8% 53.3% 16.5
adjusted for attrition bias 65.3% 49.2% 16.2
adjusted for applicant characteristics 60.7% 53.3% 7.5
adjusted for attrition bias 56.9% 49.2% 7.7
Competitive Employment
Percent both rehabilitated and having:
Competitive employment at closure
sample with applicant characteristics 61.8% 35.9% 25.9
sample with applicant characteristics and follow-up data 66.0% 37.9% 28.1
Competitive employment at follow-up
sample with applicant characteristics and follow-up data 56.0% 31.1% 24.9
adjusted for attrition bias 52.5% 29.4% 23.0
adjusted for applicant characteristics 45.2% 31.1% 14.1
adjusted for attrition bias 42.4% 29.4% 12.9
Percent having competitive employment at follow-up
sample with applicant characteristics and follow-up data 63.5% 34.4% 29.1
adjusted for attrition bias 59.5% 32.6% 26.9
adjusted for applicant characteristics 51.4% 34.4% 17.0
adjusted for attrition bias 48.1% 32.6% 15.6
*Estimates adjusted for applicant characteristics and differences after adjustments are based on a) Appendix 
Exhibit 5.2 for paid employment at follow-up for rehabilitated clients; b) Appendix Exhibit 5.1 for paid 
employment at follow-up for all served clients; c) Appendix Exhibit 5.2 for competitive employment at follow-
up for rehabilitated clients; and d) Appendix Exhibit 5.1 for competitive employment at follow-up for all served 
clients.
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Exhibit 7.2.   Factors Accounting for Differences in Paid and Competitive 
Employment at Follow-up for Served Clients*
Difference accounted for by: EstimatePaid Competitive
Beneficiary Status 7.5 17.0
All work experience variables 5.0 5.1
Post-onset work experience 3.1 3.2
Prior VR closure 0.3 0.1
Other work experience variables 1.7 1.8
Marital status 1.4 1.7
Race 0.0 -0.1
All disability variables 2.2 4.2
Disability type 0.7 2.1
Acquired/congenital -0.3 0.0
Severity 1.9 2.2
Education 0.3 0.6
Age -0.2 -0.2
Hispanic ethnicity 0.0 0.1
All other characteristics at application 0.4 0.7
Total 16.5 29.1
*Based on logit analysis of paid and competitive employment for all served 
clients (Appendix Exhibit 5.1)
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Exhibit 7.3.   Job Characteristics for Served Clients with Paid Jobs at Follow-up, by 
Beneficiary Status*
Variable and Category Non-beneficiaries Beneficiaries Difference
Hours per week
<20hrs/wk   8.1 27.4 -19.3
20-35hrs/wk 24.8 42.3 -17.5
35+hrs/wk   65.5 26.5 39.0
Missing 1.7 3.8 -2.1
Mean* 36.8 26.2 10.5
Hourly Wage (inflation adjusted to 2000)
 <$3.35      2.9 15.4 -12.5
 3.35-3.99   1.1 1.3 -0.2
 $4-4.99     2.2 4.8 -2.6
 $5-5.99     9.7 18.3 -8.6
 $6-6.99     14.8 15.5 -0.6
 $7-9.99     29.7 20.0 9.7
 $10-14.99   21.8 9.7 12.1
 $15 or more 12.2 2.2 9.9
Missing 5.6 12.8 -7.2
Mean* $9.97 $6.61 $3.36
Employer Health Insurance Benefit
No 52.3 77.7 -25.4
Yes 46.5 19.7 26.9
Missing 1.2 2.6 -1.4
Earnings per Month >$500 (i.e. SGA -- not inflation adjusted)
No 11.0 44.4 -33.4
Yes 83.0 41.8 41.2
Missing 6.0 13.8 -7.8
Client to receive ongoing support services at closure
No 7.6 18.8 -11.2
Yes 91.8 76.9 14.9
Missing 0.7 4.3 -3.6
Type of Job
Competitive 89.9 63.0 26.8
Self-Employment 6.1 7.9 -1.8
Sheltered Workshop 1.9 16.4 -14.5
Supported Employment 1.4 12.3 -10.9
Missing 0.8 0.2 0.5
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Exhibit 7.3.   Continued
Variable and Category Non-
beneficiaries Beneficiaries Difference
Monthly Earnings (inflation adjusted to 2000)
<$250      3.0 17.6 -14.6
$250-500   4.8 19.8 -15.0
$501-1000  19.7 24.5 -4.8
$1001-1500 25.1 13.5 11.6
$1501-2000 16.2 4.2 12.0
$2001-2500 9.5 4.1 5.4
$2500-3000 6.6 0.9 5.7
>$3000     9.0 1.7 7.3
Missing 6.1 13.8 -7.7
Mean* $1,455 $801 $1,637
Type of Occupation
Prof., Man., or Tech. 30.2 16.8 13.4
Clerical/Sales 18.6 14.8 3.9
Service 23.5 30.2 -6.8
Ag., Fish., Forest., etc. 1.5 1.9 -0.5
Processing 3.6 4.6 -1
Machine Trades 4.9 1.9 3
Benchwork 6.4 16.3 -9.8
Structural Work 4 1.3 2.7
Miscellaneous 0.8 1.4 -0.6
Missing 0.5 1.1 -0.6
*Based on the sample of all served clients reporting paid jobs at follow-up (2,083 non-beneficiaries 
and 564 beneficiaries).
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Exhibit 7.4   Comparison of Characteristics of Paid Jobs for Served Clients at Closure and Follow-up
Variable Non-beneficiaries Beneficiaries Difference
Non-
beneficiaries Beneficiaries Difference
Non-
beneficiaries Beneficiaries Difference
Job characteristics Log of Hourly Earnings Log of Weekly Hours Worked Log of  Monthly Earnings
Mean for paid jobs of rehabilitated (status 26) clients:
At closure
sample with applicant characteristics 2.117 1.755 0.362 3.536 3.161 0.375 7.123 6.386 0.737
sample with applicant characteristics and follow-up dat 2.151 1.741 0.410 3.548 3.117 0.431 7.170 6.328 0.842
At follow-up
sample with applicant characteristics and follow-up dat 2.202 1.681 0.521 3.555 3.110 0.445 7.228 6.261 0.967
adjusted for attrition bias 2.168 1.695 0.473 3.543 3.154 0.389 7.181 6.319 0.862
adjusted for applicant characteristics 1.986 1.681 0.305 3.543 3.110 0.331 7.181 6.261 0.636
adjusted for attrition bias 1.952 1.695 0.257 3.531 3.154 0.377 7.134 6.319 0.815
Mean for paid jobs at follow-up for served (status 26 & 28) clients
sample with applicant characteristics and follow-up dat 2.192 1.691 0.501 3.535 3.103 0.432 7.198 6.264 0.934
adjusted for attrition bias 2.158 1.705 0.453 3.523 3.147 0.376 7.151 6.322 0.829
adjusted for applicant characteristics 1.991 1.691 0.300 3.428 3.103 0.325 6.889 6.264 0.625
adjusted for attrition bias 1.957 1.705 0.252 3.416 3.147 0.269 6.842 6.322 0.520
Job characteristics Health Insurance Earnings > SGA PMT Occupation
Percent of paid jobs for rehabilitated (status 26) clients with characteristic
At closure
sample with applicant characteristics 39.8% 17.6% 22.2 89.6% 48.1% 41.5 26.3% 14.7% 11.7
sample with applicant characteristics and follow-up dat 43.4% 18.5% 24.8 90.6% 46.2% 44.4 28.4% 15.2% 13.2
At follow-up
sample with applicant characteristics and follow-up dat 50.5% 22.4% 28.1 90.6% 51.4% 39.2 31.7% 18.3% 13.4
adjusted for attrition bias 46.4% 21.3% 25.0 89.6% 53.6% 36.0 29.3% 17.6% 11.8
adjusted for applicant characteristics 44.7% 22.4% 22.3 71.7% 51.4% 20.3 22.9% 18.3% 4.6
adjusted for attrition bias 41.1% 21.3% 19.8 70.9% 53.6% 17.3 21.2% 17.6% 3.6
Percent of paid jobs at follow-up for served clients (status 26 & 28) with characteristic
sample with applicant characteristics and follow-up dat 48.0% 21.3% 26.7 88.9% 50.9% 37.9 31.2% 18.7% 12.5
adjusted for attrition bias 44.1% 20.3% 23.8 87.9% 53.1% 34.8 28.9% 18.0% 10.9
adjusted for applicant characteristics 43.1% 21.3% 21.8 71.7% 50.9% 20.8 23.0% 18.7% 4.3
adjusted for attrition bias 39.6% 20.3% 19.3 70.9% 53.1% 17.9 21.4% 18.0% 3.4
*Estimates adjusted for applicant characteristics and differences after adjustments are based on multivariate analyses reported in a) Appendix Exhibits 5.3 and 5.4 for served clients with paid 
jobs at follow-up and b) Appendix Exhibits 5.5 and 5.6 for rehabilitated clients with paid jobs at follow-up.  
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Exhibit 7.5.   Served Clients with Paid Employment at Follow-up
Characteristics at Application
Percent Difference in Mean of Percentage Difference in
Hourly Earnings Hours Worked Monthly Earnings** Health Insurance Above SGA PMT Jobs
Beneficiary status 27.1 28.3 55.5 19.4 19.1 3.8
All work experience variables 2.3 2.5 4.8 0.5 2.7 0.2
Post-onset work experience 0.4 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.0
Prior VR closure -0.1 0.1 0.0 0.5 0.6 0.4
Other work experience variables 1.9 2.4 4.4 0.1 2.0 -0.2
Marital status 1.6 1.5 3.2 0.7 1.5 0.9
African American 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.1
All disability variables 9.2 3.4 12.5 3.6 8.6 3.8
Disability type 7.0 3.6 10.5 3.8 6.9 3.2
Acquired/congenital 1.0 0.1 1.1 0.1 -0.1 0.3
Severity 1.2 -0.3 0.9 -0.2 1.8 0.3
Education 2.9 1.7 4.6 0.3 1.7 1.4
Age 0.2 -0.1 0.1 -0.1 0.1 -0.1
Hispanic ethnicity -0.3 0.0 -0.3 -0.3 0.5 -0.2
All other characteristics at application 2.0 0.2 2.2 -0.4 0.7 1.0
Total 45.5 37.6 82.9 23.8 34.8 10.9
*Based on multivariate analyses reported in Appendix Exhibits 5.3 and 5.4.
**Sum of percentages for earnings per hour and hours per month. All percentage changes are computed as changes in natural logarithms.
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Exhibit 8.1. Mean Months Worked for Rehabilitated Clients, by Months Observed 
and Beneficiary Status* 
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*Based on the sample of rehabilitated clients with follow-up data on employment(1,981 
non-beneficiaries and 585 beneficiaries). 
 
Exhibit 8.2 Percentage of Rehabilitated Clients with Earnings above SGA for 
Nine or More Months, by Number of Months Observed* 
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*Based on the sample of rehabilitated clients with follow-up data on employment and 
enough information to determine earnings relative to SGA in at least 9 of the 15 months 
beginning the third month before closure (1,661 non-beneficiaries and 492 beneficiaries). 
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Exhibit 9.1. Percentage of Applicants Determined Eligible and Served, by 
Beneficiary Status 
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*Each adjusted estimate for non-beneficiary clients is an estimate of what the relevant 
percentage would have been if the mean characteristics at application of non-
beneficiaries were the same as those of beneficiaries. Adjustments for the percentage of 
applicants determined eligible is based on our logit analysis of the percentage eligible 
reported (Appendix Exhibit 1). Adjustment for the percentage of applicants served 
required two steps. First, we computed percentages of eligible applicants served by 
beneficiary status, including an adjusted estimate for non-beneficiaries based on the logit 
analysis of the percentage of eligible applicants served (Appendix Exhibit 2). Then, we 
multiplied the three estimates produced by the corresponding estimates for percentages of 
applicants determined eligible.    
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Exhibit 9.2 Selected Outcomes for Served Clients, by Beneficiary Status* 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80%0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80%
Rehabilitated at closure
Rehab. and paid at closure
Rehab. and paid at follow-up
Total paid at follow-up
Rehab. and competitive at closure
Rehab. and comp. at follow-up
Total competitive at follow-up
Rehab. and Earn. > SGA at closure
Rehab. and Earn. > SGA at follow-up
Earnings > SGA at follow-up 
Rehab and Earn. > SGA for 9+ mo.
 
*Each estimate is based on values reported in earlier tables. Most require multiplication 
of hierarchical reported hierarchical estimates. For example, for the percentage of served 
clients who are rehabilitated and earning above SGA at closure is obtained by 
multiplying the percentage of served clients who are rehabilitated by both the percentage 
of rehabilitated clients who have paid jobs at closure and by the percentage of 
rehabilitated clients with paid jobs at closure who were earning above SGA.  Estimates 
for follow-up outcomes are adjusted for attrition bias. 
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Exhibit 9.3. Differences between Outcomes for Beneficiary and Non-beneficiary 
Clients Before and After Adjustment for Characteristics at Application* 
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Rehab. and Earn. > SGA at follow-up
Earnings > SGA at follow-up 
Rehab and Earn. > SGA for 9+ mo.
Percentage Points
Difference after Adjustment Adjustment for Other Characteristics at Application
 
*Total differences were derived from the estimates reported in Exhibit 9.2. Differences 
after adjustment were determined in an analogous fashion, using estimates of percentages 
for non-beneficiaries that were adjusted for differences in other characteristics at 
application instead of the unadjusted percentages, as reported in the text. The size of the 
adjustment is the difference between the unadjusted estimate and the adjusted estimate. 
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 TDD (607) 255-2891
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